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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which the contracts 
taken by British-based private military companies1  (PMCs) outside of the UK 
as a general tendency are in conflict or convergence with British foreign policy 
interests. Specifically, the thesis will ask if British PMCs have taken contracts 
that contradict British interests. As neither British nor international legislation 
formally regulate the type of operation PMCs can take part in (Avant 2005: 
172), British-based PMCs can in principle roam free, potentially doing damage 
to British interests. This has indeed happened – in 1998, the British PMC 
Sandline broke an international arms embargo by supplying arms to the 
supporters of the ousted Sierra Leonean president. Being in conflict with 
British interests in this regard include contravening arms embargoes the 
government is signatory to, destabilizing a fragile peace, aiding governments 
that are not seen as ‘friendly nations’ by the British Foreign Office, and in 
general “being a political embarrassment” to the UK (Foreign Office 2002:21; 
House of Commons 2002: point 2.2.2.). 
 
1. 2. Background 
One of the most remarkable developments in the post-Cold War world is the 
empowerment of non-state actors in global affairs. Non-sovereign and non-
territorially bound entities like NGOs, commercial corporations, international 
organisations and advocacy-networks have, to a degree unprecedented in the 
20th century, taken on tasks that previously were confined to the state. They 
promote democracy, offer humanitarian relief, advance economic 
liberalization, provide security, and even participate in warfare. These 
                                                
1
 In this thesis, I will use the expression Private Military Company (PMC), as this has become the 
standard term of use (Isenberg 2006). See for example the British Foreign Office’s Green Paper from 
2002. I will not distinguish between private security companies and private military companies, as 
most of the companies in the industry offer both ‘police’-like services and ‘military’ services. Besides, 
the difference between providing armed security (passive, police-type service) and engaging in combat 
(active, military-like service) is to some degree superfluous in a war-zone, as several incidents 
involving PMCs in Iraq has shown (Isenberg 2006: 14).  
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developments are not new – in the 16th and 17th century, the English and Dutch 
East India Companies waged wars and controlled colonies, and organisations 
like the Red Cross and anti-slavery groups have influenced state policy before 
as well. But, the period when non-state actors were influential internationally 
in the past was also a period during which the state system was relatively 
weak. Moreover, the non-state actors of today have access to communication 
technologies and means of transportation that enable them to circumvent the 
state to a different degree than before. Consequently, the core of the matter in 
the study of non-state actors concerns the relationship between the non-state 
actor and the state. Especially interesting is the question of how autonomous 
the non-state actor is vis-à-vis the state. Is the Weberian state monopoly over 
violence a historical anomaly, or are non-state actors such as PMCs simply 
examples of state governance through new tools (Krahmann 2003)?  
 
The control over the military force emanating from one’s own territory has 
been an intrinsic feature of the state in the modern era. With the privatisation 
of the arms industry and the emergence and proliferation of private military 
companies (PMCs), many western states fear that this control is slipping 
away2. Private military and security companies are corporate entities hired by 
governments, corporations, NGOs or others to do the work traditionally done 
by the military and the police. This includes logistical support for military 
operations, intelligence provision, military advice and training, site or 
personnel security and armed or unarmed support on the battlefield. The 
private military and security industry has experienced a massive growth in 
recent years. The war in Iraq has been referred to as “the first privatised war” 
(The Economist 2003a:56). Private companies are reportedly the second 
biggest contributor to coalition forces in Iraq after the Pentagon (Traynor 
                                                
2
 For instance, individuals in the UK Government express fears that PMCs “could have, and in some 
cases would have an adverse impact on the implementation of its foreign policy objectives” (House of 
Commons 2002: point 5.2). The concern is that, “currently these companies have no formal link to 
their home government but can operate in areas that affect British foreign policy” (ibid, point 2.2.2). In 
order to regain this control, the South African government has passed a bill aiming to prevent citizens 
from working for PMCs abroad. 
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2003), and estimates suggest that the PMC industry generates US$100billion in 
annual revenue (Kinsey 2003: 1). In Iraq alone, there are more than 180 PMCs 
operating, and an estimated three British PMC employees to every British 
soldier (Norton-Taylor 2006). Some PMCs are listed on the stock exchanges of 
their home state, and some are parts of large conglomerates included on the 
Fortune 500 list.   
 
1.3 Research question  
When examining the relationship between the British government and British-
based PMCs, I will focus on the extent to which British PMCs are profit-driven 
actors solely, or if either a fear of reputational damages, inherent national-
military norms or other influences make them limit themselves to operations 
that converge with official British foreign policy interests. Specifically, I will 
try to find out if British PMCs have taken contracts that contradict British 
foreign policy interests. Additionally, I hope that the answers to the questions 
above may shed some light on an issue of a more general nature, namely 
whether PMCs are “detached” from their home state in terms of political 
control and the influence of domestic norms of conduct; in other words “actors 
in their own right” in the international system. 
Grouped together, the issues I will consider can be divided into two categories: 
• Conflict: In which instances have PMC activities been in direct conflict 
with official British foreign policy, and what were the consequences (if 
any) for the British government and the company in question? Do the 
instances in which British PMCs have taken contracts that conflict with 
British interests lend support to the hypothesis that commercial logics 
guide PMC behaviour?  
• Convergence: Considering the fact that most PMC executives and 
employees formerly served in the British military, does a loyalty to the 
crown influence PMC activity? And, if a degree of loyalty to the crown 
is present, does this imply a loyalty to a certain conception of British 
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foreign policy interests particular for the military, or a loyalty to the 
Blair government?  
 
1.4 Relevance and expectations 
Whether PMC behaviour conflicts or converges with home state interests is an 
important question for several reasons. First, it can give some indications as to 
whether the concerns expressed over the growth of the PMC industry in recent 
years are well founded. These concerns include fears that PMCs will work for 
illegitimate clients, violate or contribute to the violation of human rights, or 
contribute to the escalation of violent conflicts (Leander 2004; Markussen 
2003; Singer 2003), in short a fear that they, as unaccountable, for-profit force-
wielders will escape all the norms, rules and political mechanisms that restrict 
the use of violence by states.  
 
Second, little has been written about the relationship between the home state, 
in other words the state in which the PMC is based, and the private security 
industry3. This relationship is by nature different from the relationship between 
the government and “normal” commercial companies. PMCs are exceptional in 
that they take on a role abroad that previously was confined to the state. Their 
employees usually wear uniforms, carry arms, and participate in military-like 
operations – all this on foreign soil. As a result, they may be mistaken as the 
representatives of their home state; they can unintentionally disturb a fragile 
peace or in other ways cause disruptions to their home state’s reputation. In 
sum, their actions are of such a nature that they may have adverse 
consequences for the diplomatic position of their home government. Third, the 
extent to which PMCs have engaged in activities that work against the interests 
of their home government will also shed some light on the wider concerns in 
the PMC-debate, namely whether PMCs challenge the state’s monopoly of 
                                                
3
 Although there is an emerging body of literature on the PMC phenomenon (see for example Singer 
2003; Avant 2005; Kinsey 2006), few authors have focused on the relationship between the home state 
and the PMC industry. One exception is Avant (2005), who touches on the topic in chapter four of her 
book. 
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violence to the extent that we can talk of an erosion of the Westphalian state 
system.  
 
Ultimately, the question of whether a PMC’s activities is in conflict or 
convergence with the foreign policy interests of its home state impinge upon 
the issue of whether PMCs pose a challenge to the state’s violence monopoly, 
that is, on the degree to which they are autonomous actors in the international 
system. One line of reasoning denies that they are; in the last instance, PMCs 
fear the state. They are subject to the approval and regulation of their home 
state, and will thus avoid behaviour that may negatively affect government 
relations (Coker 1998). A different line of reasoning points to how the 
commercial and multinational character of PMCs encourages and allows for a 
degree of independence relative to their home state (Singer 2003; Avant 2005). 
As actors concerned with maximizing profits, PMCs consider opportunities for 
making an income first, and relations with the home state second. Since the 
barriers to redeploying abroad if relations clog up are low, the state’s prospects 
for regulating the industry through legislation are limited.  
 
An empirical investigation can be helpful in clarifying the probability of each 
of these lines of reasoning. If I find that there are few examples of PMCs being 
involved in missions that could be in conflict with their home state’s foreign 
policy interests, I will argue that a view of PMCs as additional foreign policy 
tools for the state is more likely than the idea that they represent a threat to the 
state monopoly of violence as “actors in their own right”. Similarly, if I 
discover that most PMCs don’t hesitate to participate in missions that are at 
odds with their home government’s foreign policy, I will conclude that the 
reverse is more probable. In addition, it is necessary, yet difficult, to control for 
the fact that the home state may influence PMC behaviour through market 
incentives, by being one of the PMC’s clients. As commercial actors, PMCs 
must adapt their behaviour to their customer’s wishes. This thesis wants to 
measure the extent to which PMCs take their home state’s interests into 
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consideration and not their regard for their customer. I have tried to control for 
this influence by choosing a case state, the UK, which is not a major PMC 
client (Avant 2005: 168). Yet, I have to take into account the possibility that 
British PMCs may consider the UK an important potential client, and that this 
may have an effect on their behaviour.  
 
1.5 Choice of case 
I will focus on the activities of British-based PMCs, in other words PMCs that 
have their headquarters in the UK, and on British foreign policy interests. The 
British case is particularly interesting for several reasons. First, the UK, 
together with South Africa and the US, is the world’s biggest exporter of 
private security. Second, most of the companies based in the UK do not 
consider the UK to be their prime customer. The British government has not 
hired PMCs to conduct operational support and training missions to the same 
extent as the US (Avant 2005: 170). As a result, company survival does not 
rely on being hired by the British, and PMCs will not be overly sensitive to 
British interests for commercial reasons. Third, the British regulatory 
environment is informal – there is no established law regulating PMCs or the 
export of services (ibid:168). Unlike in South Africa, where government 
regulations have forced most firms to redeploy abroad or go underground, most 
British PMCs act openly and therefore lend themselves to open study as well.  
 
At present, the PMC industry is in its relative infancy. It has grown out of the 
military cultures of a small number of countries, and consequently, only a few 
states host a sizeable PMC industry, among them the UK. Thus, the focus of 
this thesis – the PMC industry in the UK – cannot be seen as a representative 
case in the sense of being one that can be used as a point of departure for 
further generalizations. Instead, it is an interesting case in and of itself, as it 
may give some indications as to what the consequences of letting the PMC 
industry stay unregulated might be. Furthermore, the PMC industry could 
develop outside the current hotspots of the US, the UK and South Africa. In 
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fact, French companies are increasingly visible internationally. Hence, the 
British case might give some indications about the potential consequences of 
the emergence of a PMC industry in other countries as well. Moreover, in 
order to get a more complete overview of the PMC industry in general, and 
over the relationship between the industry and its home state in particular, 
studies of PMC-home state relations in other states than the UK are necessary.  
 
1.6 Time frame 
The thesis focuses on the period between 1997 and 2005. There are two 
reasons for why the investigation starts with the year 1997. First, 1997 marked 
a shift in British politics with the inauguration of Tony Blair and his New 
Labour government. On the foreign policy arena, New Labour tried to develop 
a new conceptual rationale for British foreign policy, initiated by the then 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook’s announcement that the UK from then on 
would lead an “ethical foreign policy” (Williams 2004: 912). The conceptual 
framing of the foreign policy has changed somewhat with the replacement of 
Robin Cook by Jack Straw, but the foreign policy rationale still differs from 
the foreign policy of previous administrations in that it emphasizes “good 
deeds”. In sum, there has been a shift, at least in rhetoric, “from the openly 
declared pursuit of national interests in foreign policy, to the growing emphasis 
on ethical or moral duties to protect the rights and interests of others, often in 
areas where western states have little economic or geo-strategic interest” 
(Chandler 2003: 1). This concern with reputation and international standing 
affects the relationship with the PMC industry, and sets the boundaries for 
what the government considers unfavourable PMC behaviour. Second, the 
Blair period in British politics coincides with the worldwide growth of the 
private security industry. The latter half of the 1990s saw the surfacing of the 
modern PMC. The PMC issue reached the media via reports on the South 
African PMC Executive Outcome’s participation in warfare in Angola and 
Sierra Leone, but did not receive widespread attention among the British public 
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and government until 1998 with the involvement of the British PMC Sandline 
in Sierra Leone, the so-called Arms to Africa-affair (Kinsey 2003:152). 
 
1.7 Theoretical underpinnings 
I will make use of theory for two different purposes: On the one hand, I will 
explore and possibly challenge one of the central assumptions in mainstream 
IR theory, namely the view that states are the only actors that matter in 
international relations because they are believed to be violence monopolisers. 
On the other hand, I will employ two theoretical concepts explaining the 
rationality of action – the ‘logic of consequences’ and the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ – in order to explain why PMCs act as they do. The general 
pattern of PMC activities can give an indication of the underlying rationale and 
driving forces behind PMC behaviour, be it mere profit-maximisation, norm-
adherence or some other factor. 
 
Thus, while answering a specific question concerning British PMCs and 
British interests, this thesis wants to illuminate questions of a more general 
nature. These relate to the globalization debate in International Relations as 
applied onto security studies – specifically the question of whether we are 
moving away from a ‘billiard balls’ world and towards what some people call a 
‘medievalised’ international system in which both states and non-state entities 
are meaningful actors in international security. If we accept Raymond Aron’s 
dictum that the international system is defined in terms of agents capable of 
waging war against each other, does the emergence and rise of private military 
companies imply a change in the system? Admittedly, the approach of this 
essay – to gauge the degree of agency of PMCs by looking at whether they 
take their home country’s interests into regard in their activities – does not give 
a direct answer to this question. But, it could be one indicator among many of 
how detached PMCs are from states.  
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When looking for the rationale behind PMC behaviour, this thesis will use 
rational choice theory as its point of departure. The main reason for this is the 
fact that the people commenting on the private military industry generally 
appear to assume that PMCs are pursuing fast profits solely, irrespective of the 
consequences their hunt for profits may have on their relationship to other 
actors or on their own reputations (See for example Beyani and Lilly 2001, 
Fisk 2004, Leander 2004b, Makki 2004). Therefore, an investigation of these 
claims is called for before other possible explanations can be drawn into the 
analysis. Thus, this thesis will initially assume that PMCs are goal-seeking, 
profit-maximising actors solely, accepting any job as long as the financial 
gains outweigh the costs. Subsequently, the crude rational choice-based 
explanation will be refined by including two other variables; the effects of 
reputational concerns and a changing market structure. Then, the investigation 
will turn to a non-rationalist explanation, namely by asking whether the ‘logic 
of appropriateness’ can yield useful insights into why PMCs act as they do. 
PMC behaviour based on the assumptions of the ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
would result in expectations of behaviour being consistent with certain norms 
and values. As former members of national militaries and as citizens, one can 
argue that British PMC executives have been socialized into holding a loyalty 
to crown and country in high regard, a stance that is reflected in PMC 
behaviour. The thesis does not expect to find conclusive answers regarding a 
PMC’s motivations for taking certain jobs. Rather, the purpose of discussing 
the basis for PMC behaviour is exploratory; it is borne out of a wish to detect 
general tendencies in order to be better equipped to predict the future 
developments of the industry. 
 
1.8 Methods and proceedings 
This is an exploratory study, focusing on the British PMC industry as a single 
case. According to Yin, a case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (1994: 
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13). Yin holds that “the single case study may be conducted as a prelude to 
further study, such as the use of case studies as exploratory devices” (1994: 
41). Furthermore, he argues that “a rationale for a single case is one in which 
the case represents an extreme or unique case (ibid: 39, original italics). This 
study is exploratory in that it focuses on a rather novel phenomenon – the 
private military industry – and on a particular aspect of that phenomenon, 
namely the relationship between PMCs and the state in which they are based, 
that has received little attention among researchers. The exploratory study will 
sometimes have to make concessions in terms of the degree to which it is able 
to follow stringent methodological principles (Stebbins 2001: 42). When the 
information available is scarce, and when there are few previous studies with 
which to compare the findings of the current study, the conclusions one can 
draw from one’s findings will necessarily be less definite than what is the case 
when researching a well-explored topic. This is also true for this project; it 
must be seen as an indicative rather than definite study. The relationship 
between the home state and the private military industry is an area of study that 
begs for more research, also with regards to other countries than the UK.  
 
Furthermore, one can argue that the relationship between the British 
government and the private security industry constitutes a unique case. Of all 
the countries that host significant private military industries, the UK is the only 
one that has not implemented any form of regulation (Kinsey 2003:176). 
Consequently, different dynamics will surface in the British example than in 
other instances of state-PMC relations. Yet, the question can become relevant 
in a wider context too, as it might imply something about the future 
developments in countries with emerging PMC industries, such as France and 
Italy (Krahmann 2002: 6). In addition, this is a qualitative study, as it goes in-
depth in its investigation of the relationship between the British government 
and the British private military industry, giving a comprehensive account of a 
selection of incidents (King et al 1994: 4). The study also contains elements of 
two other strands of case study research; it is descriptive because it gives an 
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account of British PMCs and their activities, and explanatory when discussing 
the basis for these activities (Hellevik 2002: 88).  
 
1.8.1 Units of analysis 
The main objective of the study is to find out to what extent the contracts taken 
by British PMCs abroad are in conflict or convergence with British foreign 
policy interests. In order to answer this question, one has to identify the 
relevant units of analysis, in other words British-based PMCs, find out as much 
as possible about the activities they have been involved in, and conceptualize 
what is meant by “British interests” in this regard. To this end, I have compiled 
a database of information on British PMCs. Via extensive research based on 
academic literature, journalistic accounts and the internet, I have identified 39 
British-based companies that fit the description of a PMC as presented in this 
chapter. These are companies that offer various services of a military nature 
and that are able to deploy former military personnel overseas on short notice 
(McCarthy 2006). Subsequently, I have had the list of companies verified by 
people familiar with the private military industry4. I have gathered as much 
information about individual companies and the activities they have been 
involved in as possible, and systematized this in a database, all the while 
looking for evidence of PMCs entering into agreements that violate British 
interests, as defined below. The sources of information for this database will be 
elaborated subsequently. The object of analysis for this investigation is not the 
conduct of the individual private soldier when he or she is out in the field. 
Rather, it is the behaviour of the people who decide where to send the soldier I 
am interested in. Just like theories of international relations use state behaviour 
as a shorthand reference for the aggregate actions of the individuals in 
government, this thesis will look at the aggregate actions of the individuals in 
the managerial teams of PMCs, and refer to this as ‘PMC behaviour’ or ‘PMC 
activities’. Thus, when answering the main question of the thesis, the focus of 
                                                
4
 It has been verified by Dr Christopher Kinsey of King’s College London and by the British 
Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC). 
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this study is on the type of operation, the type customer and the political 
situation in the state in which the PMC operate. 
 
1.8.2 Operationalizing British interests 
Construct validity refers to “establishing correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied” (Yin 2003: 34). The data one collects must be of 
relevance to the question the research is trying to answer. Operationalising 
‘British interests’ and setting the boundaries for when PMC activities would be 
seen to cut across these interests is a challenge. In this context, I do not refer to 
British interests in general, but to the specific set of British foreign policy goals 
that risk negative influence from the activities of PMCs. The British Foreign 
Office’s 2002 Green Paper on Private Military Companies is instructive in this 
regard. It was written as a result of an incident in which the British PMC 
Sandline’s activities in Sierra Leone embarrassed the British government by 
violating an arms embargo, the so-called Arms-to-Africa affair. Thus, it 
focuses particularly on the disadvantages related to hosting an unregulated 
PMC industry. Based on the stipulations of the Green Paper, I have drawn a list 
of five types of PMC activities that are in conflict with British interests: a) 
aiding governments that are not seen as friendly nations by the British 
government; b) aiding governments with a dismal human rights record; c) 
committing criminal offences, such as breaking an arms embargo; d) deploying 
soldiers to regions where there is an imminent danger that the presence of 
PMC personnel could contribute to further destabilization; and, finally, e) 
being a political embarrassment to the UK. As these points in some 
circumstances can be subject to interpretation, I have added a final criterion of 
official response to increase the study’s reliability and to avoid making it 
subjective. In other words, I will consider a PMC to cut across British foreign 
policy interests if it commits any of the above-mentioned activities, and the 
activity is met with a negative response from the government. 
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1.8.3 Categorizing PMCs 
Coercive force for hire comes in three basic shapes: Mercenaries, private 
military companies, and private security companies (Spear 2006: 16). The 
second category is the subject of this analysis. PMCs are different from 
mercenaries in that they are established, organised corporate structures, and 
different from private security companies, like Group4Securicor or Securitas, 
in that the services they offer go beyond the defensive, unarmed static guarding 
services offered by the security companies. Many attempts have been made at 
developing some form of typology of the PMC industry, borne out of a wish to 
distinguish between types of companies and their differing relationship to the 
use of force. The most common typology is the one developed by Singer, 
where the different companies are placed in categories according to their 
activities. Thus, Singer (2003: 93) presents three types of PMCs, organized 
according to a “tip of the spear”-typology. Military provider firms, like 
Sandline and Executive Outcomes, offer implementation and command and are 
closest to the tip of the spear. One stop away from the tip is the military 
consultant firm, offering advice and training. In the UK, AMA Associated and 
Saladin are examples of this type of company. The furthest away from the tip 
is the military support firm, offering non-lethal aid and assistance. However, 
the usefulness of placing companies in a strict typology according to their 
activities can be questioned.  Most companies offer a wide range of activities, 
and most PMC employees have skills and training that enable them to move 
swiftly across the spectrum of services offered – from consultancy and training 
to military deployment, depending on the client’s requests (Kinsey 2003:87). 
Indeed, the changes in private military industry’s market structure, occurring as 
the result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, implies that the activities PMCs 
offer are structured by client demands – by the market – rather than by 
capabilities inherent in the company (Avant 2005:17). This fluidity is made 
apparent by the fact that most PMCs resist being categorized out of a fear of 
losing business opportunities (Kinsey 2006:16), and by the wide range of 
  -14- 
 
services offered by many of the companies. The variety of services offered by 
the UK PMC Thule, for example, is not untypical for the industry:  
Strategic support, the selection and training of Special Forces troops, 
counterinsurgency training, basic and advanced infantry training, weapons 
recommendation and procurement, intelligence services, humanitarian 
support and advice on objectives, logistics, air operations, and defence force 
reorganization (Thule website).  
Therefore, this thesis will not follow a strict typology, but include all British-
based companies that operate globally and offer services similar to the ones 
offered by Thule, in short, all services of a military nature5. It has also been 
necessary to include all 39 British-based PMCs in this study. If I had chosen to 
focus on a select few only, I could have ended up with an unrepresentative 
sample, and would have risked drawing conclusions based on the activities of 
companies that are either more or less in line with British foreign policy than 
the overall trend. Furthermore, as the question asked in this study is a relatively 
straightforward one – whether or not British PMCs have taken on tasks that the 




I have used three different sources for data-collection: first-hand documents of 
PMC activity, second-hand journalistic or scholarly accounts, and 
interviewing. In terms of material explaining the PMC’s viewpoint, the first-
hand written accounts I rely on include the PMCs’ own publications, reports, 
press releases and web sites. These provided information on the services the 
different companies offer, previous and ongoing contracts, geographical 
presence and ownership structures. In addition, they are interesting indicators 
revealing how PMCs wish to be perceived by a wider audience. In terms of the 
other side of the story – British foreign policy and the government’s 
relationship with the private military industry – I have made use of official 
documents from the British government. These include the 2002 Green Paper 
                                                
5
 A list of all 39 companies and the services they offer can be found in the appendix. 
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on PMCs mentioned above, transcripts of parliamentary debates on PMCs, 
House of Commons reports and legislation. The documents from the British 
government were the main material of information concerning the 
government’s relationship with the PMC industry.  
 
Journalistic and scholarly accounts sometimes reveal information about PMC 
operations that the PMC itself prefers to conceal, and have therefore been of 
great use. However, most of the academic research on PMCs focus on the 
activities of companies like Sandline and Executive Outcomes in the late 1990s 
(See, for example, Howe 1998; Singer 2000; Leander 2003; Spear 2006). 
These companies took part in tip-of-the-spear, combat-related operations to a 
much greater extent than today’s PMCs, and as a result, parts of the academic 
literature on PMCs presumes a bigger role for this type of operation than what 
is the case at present. Therefore, the academic literature had to be 
complemented by newspaper articles. Importantly, the information gained via 
journalistic accounts has been double checked so as to avoid drawing 
conclusions from what are merely speculations. Where articles set out 
controversial claims regarding British companies, these claims have only been 
taken into consideration if they have received backing from interviewees, 
vetted governmental reports or reliable academic literature.  
 
As few have written about my specific topic previously, and little written 
information can be found that directly addresses my question, I have conducted 
several interviews. In my interviews with PMC representatives, I have tried to 
find out which operations they and their competitors have engaged in, their 
relationship with the foreign office, and the degree to which they let British 
foreign policy guide their actions, all the while keeping in mind that they have 
strong incentives to hold unfavourable information hidden. Therefore, I have 
also interviewed people studying the British private military industry; notably 
Dr Christopher Kinsey of King’s College London/The UK Defence Academy. 
In order to get an overview of the government’s relationship with the private 
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military industry, I have interviewed the British Foreign Office official 
responsible for overseeing the British PMC industry. The interviewees were 
mainly intended to function as “verifiers” of previously assembled information, 
but they also contributed with new data. There are clear challenges involved 
with trying to uncover data that some of those involved would prefer to keep 
hidden. The method of data collection employed in this study – triangulation – 
goes some way in overcoming these challenges. Triangulation refers to the use 
of two or more methods for data collection in order to minimize the reliance on 
particular bodies of knowledge (Frankfort-Nachimas&Nachimas 1996:206). 
When the findings yielded by different methods for data collection are 
consistent, the validity of those findings is increased (ibid). Thus, each source I 
employ has been valuable both because of the information obtained, and 
because the sources function as answer books against which I can test the 
accuracy of the information gained from other sources.  
 
1.9 Structure 
The following chapter, Chapter Two, will present the theoretical framework of 
the thesis. It will use rationalist and constructivist theories of action as the 
broad points of departure for deducing different hypotheses that can explain 
the rationale behind the behaviour of PMCs. Chapter Three will place the 
British PMC industry in a wider context. It will look at the history of privately 
organised force, at the emergence of the modern-day PMC, and at the efforts 
made at regulating the industry in the UK. Chapter Four will present the 
empirical findings that form the answer to the research question. It will 
establish whether the dominant trend of PMC activities is convergence or 
conflict with British foreign policy interests. Chapter Five will apply the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter Two onto these findings, and discuss the 
rationale behind PMC decision-making. The conclusion will sum up the 
findings and discuss their implication for the debates concerning the PMC’s 
relative autonomy from the state.  
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Chapter Two 
Theorizing PMC emergence and behaviour 
This chapter unites two slightly disparate themes under one heading. The first 
theme – concerning the theoretical significance of the emergence of PMCs – 
will not amount to a full theoretical discussion, but rather function as a 
demonstration of why this study is important. By asking whether the British 
PMC industry’s activities conflict or converge with the foreign policy interests 
of their home state, this thesis wants to learn something about the broader 
implications of the re-emergence and rise of non-state actors in international 
security. In particular, I am interested in the power relationship between states 
and non-state actors: Will non-state actors always be at the mercy of the 
nation-states in which they are based, or are they to some degree autonomous 
of the state in terms of having both the capacity and the will to disregard the 
state’s interests? The first section will give a run-through of how these issues 
relate to the emergence of PMCs. The second theme – the theoretical 
foundations for analyzing PMC activities – constitutes the bulk of the chapter. 
The thesis argues that the extent to which PMCs act in conflict or convergence 
with British interests can reveal something about the underlying rationale, 
influences and motivations that steer PMCs when they consider a contract. 
Since PMCs are commercial actors, this thesis will use rational choice theory, 
one of the building blocs of microeconomics, as a point of departure. 
Accordingly, the thesis will try to find the extent to which profit-maximisation 
is the dominant influence behind PMC decision-making. In addition, I will 
launch two competing explanations – one based on a moderate version of 
rational choice theory, and one drawing on the concept of the logic of 
appropriateness – as alternatives. The purpose of this chapter is not to discuss 
any of these theoretical concepts in great detail. Rather, they will be used as 
tools to discern the dominating pattern and rationale behind PMC activity 
   
  -18- 
 
3.1 The state and non-state actors in international relations  
One of the important questions in International Relations (IR) theory concerns 
who we consider to be the principal actors on the international arena. In the 
field of international security, conventional IR theory, and perhaps in particular 
the family of theories referred to as realist, hold states to be the only actors of 
importance internationally. Hence, when these theories try to say something 
about why states act as they do – say, why states go to war – they draw on the 
interaction of states in the international system for developing explanations. 
For instance, neorealists point to how states’ fear of each other’s offensive 
capabilities may lead to arms races and lock two or more states into a 
continuous security dilemma, and to how states are likely to resort to balancing 
behaviour if one state in the system becomes too powerful (see, for example 
Waltz 1979 or Mearsheimer 2001). States are considered to be the only 
meaningful actors internationally because they are believed to monopolize the 
use of force domestically: “Traditional notions about authority in the 
international system derive from Weberian conceptions of the state and of the 
domain of international politics.” (Biersteker and Hall 2002: 3). However, if 
the capacity to use force defines who is a meaningful actor, PMCs cannot 
easily be disregarded. They are non-state actors with force-capabilities, and 
unlike terrorist networks, for instance, their existence is tolerated and accepted 
by states. Using realist theory as broadly defined as a point of departure, this 
section will briefly demonstrate why the question of PMC-home state 
compliance can be interesting from a theoretical perspective. 
 
For realists, anarchy renders militarily relevant power to be the key 
independent variable for understanding international relations. In an anarchic 
world, international affairs are essentially conflictual. No one can be trusted, 
and thus states “must eschew cooperation in favour of self-help” in order to 
survive (Hobson 2000:21). In the last resort, only force can ensure a state’s 
survival. Since states traditionally have been the sole possessors of militarily 
relevant power, realists have considered states to be the only central actors in 
  -19- 
 
international affairs. In the words of Waltz (1979:94) “states set the scene in 
which they, along with non-state actors stage their dramas or carry out their 
humdrum affairs (…). When the crunch comes, states remake the rules by 
which other actors operate”. It is the distribution of power across the 
international system that is the key to analysing state behaviour internationally: 
“The nature of the power relationship amongst states affects their expectations 
of success or failure” (Croft et al 1999:35). Consequently, “large changes in 
relative power across the system constitute a change in structure, which affects 
the expectation of how states will behave and the outcomes their actions will 
produce” (ibid). Thus, realists have refuted claims that non-state actors may be 
influential in international affairs on the grounds that non-state actors lack 
militarily relevant capabilities and that their survival therefore ultimately relies 
on the goodwill of states.  
 
If we accept the key assumptions of realist theory – that the international 
system is anarchic, that power is the key variable in international relations, and 
that the quest for power is a zero-sum game – it is interesting to evaluate the 
significance of the emergence of PMCs. In essence, the final test of whether 
PMCs can be considered influential actors on the international scene on par 
with states concerns the extent to which PMCs can disregard state interests. If 
PMCs can operate as if the state, including home states and client states, has no 
influence over PMC actions, then one can speak of the demise of the realist 
billiard balls model. Admittedly, this hypothesis cannot be tested easily. But, 
by looking at whether British-based PMCs take the interests of the UK into 
consideration, despite not being legally obliged to doing so, this thesis takes a 
small, though far from comprehensive step towards evaluating the significance 
of PMCs as actors on the international arena. The rationale behind PMC 
behaviour – crudely put, whether profit-maximising or other influences, such 
as norms and values dominate, can also say something about the potential of 
the PMC to work against the interests of its home state. The theoretical 
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framework for discerning PMC influences will be presented in the remainder 
of this chapter.     
 
3.2 Logics of action 
When explaining the basis for behaviour, researchers and students often draw 
on either one of two different logics of action – the logic of appropriateness 
and the logic of consequences. These are not substantive theories of 
international relations, but theoretical methodologies that can be used as the 
starting points for developing specific hypotheses and theories (Snidal 2002: 
74). As such, the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences are 
intrinsic components of respectively constructivist and rationalist theories of 
IR. Indeed, some people hold them to be the defining features of the two 
theoretical families: “Risse suggests that the central dividing line between 
rationalist or constructivist or sociological theories is exactly that they bring to 
bear different conceptions of the rationality of action” (Sending 2002: 444). 
The core difference between the logic of consequences and the logic of 
appropriateness lies in their differing conceptions of which factors that are the 
most influential in governing individual behaviour. The logic of consequences 
sees action as driven by anticipated consequences and prior preferences; the 
logic of appropriateness emphasises how an actor’s prior identity can form the 
basis for behaviour (March and Olsen 1998: 949; Sending 2002: 447).  
 
3.2.1 The logic of consequences and rational choice theory 
The logic of consequences is the foundation for one of the most significant 
methodological assumptions of modern social sciences like economics and 
political science, namely rational choice theory. Rational choice theory is a 
behavioural theory originally derived from economics (Jackson and Sørensen 
2003: 243). According to Jackson and Sørensen, rational choice “seeks to 
provide empirical theories of how actors can be predicted to behave in their 
relations with other actors with whom they are dealing” (ibid, 242). Briefly 
summed up, it can be described as “goal-directed choice in which the options 
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are clearly defined and definitely limited but information is imperfect or 
incomplete” (ibid). Thus, it is an analytical tool employed in different 
disciplines and theories, but does not on its own make substantial claims. It is 
an intrinsic component of much rationalist theorizing in IR, including 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. There are several examples of well-
known research within the field of IR based on the assumptions of rational 
choice theory. For instance, when explaining why states develop international 
regimes, Robert Keohane (1984) emphasises what they gain from doing so. 
Assuming that states have common interests, the benefits they get from 
cooperating in terms of reduced transaction costs and increased access to 
information outweigh the costs of having to follow rules. Similarly, realists 
like John Mearsheimer (2001) hold that in an anarchic world where states are 
unsure of each others’ intentions, seek survival as their ultimate goal, and 
possess offensive capabilities, states are likely to act aggressively rather than 
conciliatory towards each other because this increases their chances of staying 
secure.   
 
Based on the assumptions of rational choice, economic theory assumes that 
firms are rational egoists seeking the best possible outcome; they are, in other 
words, driven by a ‘logic of consequences’ (Frank 1991: 23). Accordingly, as 
PMCs are commercial companies operating in an open market, a natural point 
of departure when explaining the basis for their activities is rational choice 
theory. In other words, this thesis will initially assume that PMC behaviour is 
consistent with the expectations of rational choice theory, and that the premises 
for their activities are set by the logic of consequences. The logic of 
consequences explains individual and collective outcomes in terms of 
individual goal-seeking under constraints. Agents are “driven by preferences 
and expectations about consequences. Behaviour is wilful, reflecting an 
attempt to make outcomes fulfil subjective desires, to the extent possible” 
(March and Olsen 1989: 160). Thus, the logic of consequences holds actors to 
be asocial in that exogenously given interests steer their behaviour. By 
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strategically calculating their options, agents seek to maximise their gains and 
minimize their losses. The agents’ identity and the institutional environments 
in which they operate are not believed to have any significant impact on the 
choices they make. The agent is instrumentally driven, a homo economicus or 
“a calculating machine who carefully assesses different courses of actions, 
choosing whichever provides the most efficient means to her ends” (Fearon 
and Wendt 2002: 30).  
 
3.2.2 Rational Expectations of PMC Behaviour 
Not surprisingly, given that rational choice theory’s roots are in economics, 
logic of consequences-assumptions applied onto PMCs render expectations of 
market actor behaviour. Following Fearon and Wendt’s recipe for using 
rational choice theory to explain actions (2002: 54), “one starts with an action 
or pattern of actions to be explained”. In this context, the action to be explained 
is the contracts taken by PMCs. Second, “one posits a set of actors with the 
capacity to take the actions in question”. Here, the actors in question are 
individual UK-based PMCs. Third, “one proposes a sequence of choices that 
embeds the pattern of actions to be explained in a larger universe of 
possibilities”. Quite unsurprisingly, the sequence of choices in this context is 
the two opposites of either accepting or rejecting a contract. Fourth, one 
“makes arguments about the actor’s preferences over the universe of possible 
outcomes identified in point”. As a commercial enterprise, the foremost goal of 
the PMC is to maximise profits. Profit is defined as the difference between 
total revenue and total cost, where total cost includes all costs associated with 
resources used by the firm (Frank 1991, 329). Thus, rational choice theory 
renders the expectation that PMCs will take any contract provided the financial 
gains outweigh the costs.  
 
3.2.3 Alternative explanations: rationality refined 
Two alternative accounts of expected PMC behaviour may challenge the 
explanatory value of the crude rational-egoistic assumptions based on rational 
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choice theory. The first alternative explanation is a moderate version of 
rational choice theory. It relaxes the demands to generalizability and 
simplicity, and incorporates two non-monetary costs as possible impediments 
to a pure profit-oriented cost-benefit calculation. This approach can still be 
called rationalist, as the assumption of rational egoism is retained. In the PMC 
context, two types of non-monetary costs – reputation and market structure – 
stand out as being the most significant for determining which contracts can be 
deemed unattractive. The first factor, reputation, is a common concern, and 
indeed a “valuable commodity” for many organizations (Miller 2003: 40). 
Reputation can be defined as “a judgment about an actor’s past behavior that is 
used to predict future behavior” (ibid, 42). Firms, including PMCs, are 
concerned about the potential effect current activities can have on the firm’s 
reputation, and about the effect the company’s reputation has on its ability to 
attract new customers. For PMCs, working for a non-reputable customer can 
be one way of tarnishing one’s own reputation. Thus, if we incorporate this 
concern into the crude rational choice-expectation presented above, we are left 
with the prospect that PMCs will take any contract as long as the financial 
gains outweigh both financial and reputation-related costs.  
 
Second, structural factors may also have an effect on the types of tasks that are 
available for PMCs. The structure of the private military market is shaped by 
the frequency and occurrence of conflicts and civil unrest, coupled with the 
presence of a paying customer. Changes in market structure can make certain 
types of contracts less available or less attractive compared to other contracts. 
For instance, one can imagine that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq has 
opened up a new market for force both by causing unrest and by bringing in 
customers that are financially reliable, and thereby making other types of 
customers, for instance developing states, less attractive in comparison. Hence, 
if we take market structure into account, we are left with the expectation that 
prior to calculating whether the financial benefits outweigh the financial and 
reputation-related costs, the structure of the market steers PMCs towards a 
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certain geographical area and a certain type of customer, in other words a 
certain type of contract.    
 
3.2.4 The logic of appropriateness  
The second alternative explanation, based on a logic of appropriateness as 
opposed to a logic of consequences, steps away from the rational-egoistic 
assumptions of rational choice theory. As Elster notes, rational choice is above 
all else a normative theory (quoted in Mercer 2005: 78-79). It “explains how 
one should reason, not how one actually reasons” (Mercer 2005: 80). 
Therefore, bringing in the logic of appropriateness to complement rational 
choice-based assumptions is an attempt at making the initial explanation less 
assumptive, or, one might say, more refined. The ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
emphasises the identity of the agents as a factor influencing behaviour. 
Accordingly, “agents do not choose between the most efficient alternative, but 
follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, 
approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities 
between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of 
self and situations” (March and Olsen 1989: 51). Rationality, according to the 
logic of appropriateness, is bounded by rules, norms and identities: it “lies less 
in choosing instrumentally on the basis of true theories than in behaving in 
ways that stand to reason, given people’s background, expectations and 
dispositions” (Adler 2002: 103). The agent does not exist in a vacuum; his or 
her identity, surroundings and experiences structure and set the premises for 
the choices he or she makes. He or she is a homo sociologicus, “a rule-follower 
who acts out of habit or decides what to do by posing the question ‘how is a 
person in my role (or with my identity) supposed to act in this circumstance?’” 
(Fearon and Wendt 2002, 60).  
 
According to March and Olsen (1989, 38), actions are fitted to situations by 
their appropriateness within a conception of identity, and are institutionalized 
through structures of rules and routines. Moreover, they “see rules as reflecting 
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historical experience in a way that ordinarily makes the rules, but not the 
experience, accessible to individuals who have not themselves lived through 
the experience” (ibid, 38). Hence, in a logic of appropriateness-perspective, 
agents are less autonomous and more embedded in the social structure they are 
a part of than a logic of consequences-model would assume them to be. This 
belief is evident in much constructivist research. Instead of looking at interests 
as being something “out there” for states to pick and choose from, the focus is 
on the role of social structures as constitutive of agent behaviour. Thus, Martha 
Finnemore (1996, 2) asserts that “State interests are defined in the context of 
internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and 
appropriate”.  
 
3.2.5 The logic of appropriateness and PMC behaviour 
In a chapter of her book The Purpose of Intervention (2003), Martha 
Finnemore shows how the entry of professional lawyers into the foreign 
ministries of a large number of states influenced the way states resolve 
conflicts. The lawyers established legal norms about appropriate and effective 
methods of conflict resolution, thus contributing to ending the practice of 
military intervention for the collection of national debt. In essence, Finnemore 
argues that “professional training specifically aims to instil powerful norms 
and worldviews into the people it credentials. Organizations staffed and 
directed by members of a profession will behave according to its norms as a 
consequence” (Finnemore 2003:27). Similarly, when applying a logic of 
appropriateness-perspective to PMC behaviour, we are interested in how the 
“insides” of the managerial teams – the professional background and identity 
of the members – influence their choices. Most of the members of the 
managerial teams of British PMCs are former British Army soldiers. Thus, the 
institutional setting for analysing the most important rules and values in PMCs 
is a military one. March and Olsen (1989: 160) argue that “When individuals 
enter an institution, they try to discover, and are taught, the rules. When they 
encounter a new situation, they try to associate it with a situation for which 
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rules already exist.” As former members of the British army, PMC managers 
have been taught the contents, rules of behaviour and expectations of their 
occupation in an organization firmly embedded in the western military 
tradition. If we accept that the military is an institution in the sense of being 
“collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in 
terms of relations between roles and situations” (March and Olsen quoted in 
Peters 1999: 28), we can say that they are institutionalised; they have been 
subject to “a process by which social processes, obligations, or actualities 
come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action” (Meyer and 
Rowan 1991: 42). As commercial enterprises, the purpose of the PMCs’ 
existence is above all to make money. Therefore, profit-maximising behaviour 
can be considered to be consistent with the ‘logic of appropriateness’ – seeking 
financial reward is the appropriate thing for a PMC to do. Hence, the initial 
explanation – that PMCs take any contract provided the profits outweigh the 
costs – is retained, but made more sophisticated by adding presumptions drawn 
from a conception of appropriateness. Based on the assumption that the norms 
and values instilled through the socialization into a professional culture creates 
a professional identity that will continue to direct behaviour in new situations, 
one can expect British PMCs to take any contract as long as it is financially 
rewarding, and does not run counter to conception of what is right and 
appropriate, based on the values learned in the British Army. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
The chapter began by asking whether the emergence of the private military 
company can have implications for IR theory. Non-state actors with force-
capabilities may fulfil realist criteria stipulating what a significant actor on the 
international arena is. However, this does not necessarily imply that IR theory 
should include PMCs on the same level as states when developing theories 
about the causes of war. Non-state actors still abide by the rules of gravity, and 
are therefore dependent on the state in a number of ways. States are the hosts 
of PMC headquarters, the scenes of PMC operations and sometimes customers 
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buying PMC services. When a state hosts PMCs, the state can regulate their 
activities through legislation. Yet, the UK is home to a large PMC industry and 
has not imposed any formal regulation. This thesis explores whether this 
results in a PMC industry running wild, doing whatever is profitable, or 
whether there are informal measures at play restricting PMC activities. The last 
section of this chapter helped set the scene for investigating this issue. A 
natural point of departure for making assumptions about PMC activities is 
rational choice theory. In its analysis of PMC activities, this thesis will initially 
assume that PMCs take any contract, provided the financial gains outweigh the 
costs. This chapter also presented two alternative explanations of PMC 
behaviour, should the initial expectation fail to single-handedly explain PMC 
behaviour. The first alternative is a moderated version of rational choice 
theory. It brings in two new variables – a concern about reputation, and the 
effect of market structure – as additional factors steering what type of contract 
the PMC takes. The second alternative makes a departure from instrumental 
rationality altogether, drawing instead on the logic of appropriateness. It 
focuses on the degree to which PMC managers act out of a conception of what 
they find to be right and appropriate. Chapters Four and Five will analyse the 
empirical material in light of these claims. 
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Chapter Three 
The history of privately organised violence and the rise of PMCs 
 
In order to address the question of whether modern-day PMCs take their home 
government’s interests into account, it is necessary to place the PMC 
phenomenon in a wider historical and geopolitical context. This can tell us 
something about how unique PMCs are as private wielders of military force, 
and inform us of the historical relationship between the state and force-waging 
non-state actors. After a brief examination of how the relationship between the 
state and private organised violence has played out through history, this 
chapter will look at the emergence of the modern-day PMC. It will stress the 
ways in which PMCs differ from mercenaries, and discuss the reasons behind 
the post-Cold War emergence of corporate force for hire. Lastly, it will look at 
the relationship between the British state and British PMCs; it will examine the 
reasons for why the UK has become one of the global hotspots for the PMC 
industry, and recapitulate the discussions concerning the prospect of regulating 
British PMCs.  
 
2.1 The state and non-state violence 
The view of legitimate military force as an intrinsic feature of the state has 
been dominant both in academia and in politics since the late 19th century 
(Held et al 1999: 87-101). Organized violence emanating from entities other 
than the state is usually considered illegitimate, and is typically labelled 
“guerrilla warfare”, “insurgency”, “crime”, or “mercenary activity”. The more 
acceptable notion of “warring party” is commonly reserved for the state. As 
Van Creveld (1991: 41) remarks, “to distinguish war from mere crime, it was 
defined as something waged by sovereign states and by them alone”. Indeed, 
the very definition of the modern nation state that arguably underpins our 
understanding of violence in international politics is Max Weber’s 
conceptualisation of the state as a sovereign actor “successfully upholding a 
claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in enforcement of 
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its order” (Weber 1964:154). Yet, as many of those commenting on the rise of 
the private military industry have observed, the system of sovereign states 
controlling the use of violence is not the inevitable condition of international 
relations. It is neither universal in temporal nor in spatial terms. In fact, "[T]he 
monopoly of the state over violence is the exception in world history, rather 
than the rule. The state itself is a rather new unit of governance, appearing only 
in the last four hundred years. Moreover, it drew from the private violence 
market to build its public power” (Singer 2003: 19-20).  
 
Mercenary activity – ‘soldiers of fortune’ fighting for private gain rather than a 
wider cause, employed on ad-hoc basis for a short period of time – is not a new 
phenomenon. Military history contains accounts of hired foreigners fighting in 
wars long before the current system of nation states with standing armies came 
into existence. The first official reference to mercenaries occurred as early as in 
the history of King Shulgi of Ur, 2097 B. C. (Singer 2003: 20). Ancient history 
contains numerous examples of for-profit soldiering: the Bible tells the story of 
how the Pharaoh chased the Israelites out of Egypt with hired troops; Ancient 
Greek armies were commonly built up by a combination of citizens and foreign 
specialists; the army of Alexander the Great was made up by mainly hired 
soldiers; in the Second Punic War, Hannibal crossed the Alps with a hired 
army, and so on. Medieval times saw the emergence of the condottieri, private 
units contracted by business guilds or Italian city states. Between 1600 and 
1800, it was common to hire foreigners into one’s own national forces, and to 
allow citizens to join the militaries of other states, indeed “nationality or 
country of origin was not the primary basis for determining service 
obligations” (Thomson 1994: 32). In short, “in the era before the rise of the 
state, market allocation of force prevailed and virtually all force was 
contracted” (Avant 2005: 27).  
 
As warfare began to change with the Napoleonic wars in the late 18th century, 
the use of mercenaries declined. The emergence of easy-to-use firearms meant 
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that numerical superiority began to matter more than combat skills on the 
battleground, and gradually hired soldiers gave way to mass armies - standing 
forces made up of citizens (Diesen 2004). According to Michael Roberts, 
mercenaries contributed to the development of the modern national army, and 
thus to the consolidation of the state system: “Sovereigns relied on mercenaries 
because they had more training than civilian militias, and the mercenaries 
served as a nucleus around which an army could be built” (quoted in Serewizc 
2002: 77). Just as the advances in warfare technology contributed to the demise 
of mercenaries, so did the emergence of mass standing armies help to 
consolidate the state system, and the state started to monopolise war fighting. 
Still, mercenary activity did not disappear completely in “the era of the state”. 
In 1854, Britain hired 16.500 German, Italian, and Swiss mercenaries for the 
Crimean War, and in the 1860s, an American soldier formed the Shanghai 
Foreign Legion, made up of mercenaries from 80 countries including the US, 
the UK, Denmark, and Norway (Thomson 1994: 86-89). The East India 
Trading Companies resemble current-day PMCs in that they were organised, 
permanent enterprises largely operating outside of the order of the European 
state system (Singer 2003: 34). The East India Companies hired mercenaries 
and used their military arm to force out trade competitors. The companies’ 
policies toward other Europeans in non-European regions did generally not 
reflect the stance of their home states; indeed, company behaviour was more or 
less independent of European interstate relations (Thomson 1994: 60). The 
companies occasionally used force against their home state, and sometimes 
even drew their home state into wars it would not otherwise have taken part in 
(ibid: 61).  
 
However, as the state system spread across the globe in the 20th century, norms 
against private soldiering took hold, and corporations with military wings 
disappeared. Singer calls this period “the individualisation of the private 
market” (2003: 37), and Thomson (1994: 95) emphasises the ad hoc nature of 
the mercenaries of the 1900s. The 20th century saw the development of the 
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mercenary as he is often thought of today: individual ex-soldiers and 
adventurers offering their services on an informal, secretive basis, for the most 
part operating in the third world. Individual mercenary activity had its heyday 
in the decolonisation period, which gave rise to infamous characters like 
”Mad” Mike Hoare and Bob Denard, part of the gang of mercenaries known by 
the telling name “Les Affreux”. O’Brien (2000:5) describes the term 
“mercenaries” as “a pejorative one, conjuring up an image of a hardened white 
soldier brutally intervening in a small, hitherto unknown African country for 
financial gain”. The individual “villain” mercenary still makes a profit from 
participating in wars around the globe. Yet, he is different from the organised 
soldiers for hire of the present and the more distant past. The “villain” 
mercenary is generally seen as an illegitimate and shadowy figure, operating 
covertly. Today’s PMCs are for the most part considered legitimate entities. 
Little bears more evidence of this than the fact that they are hired regularly by 
the militarily most advanced state in the system, the US, and occasionally by 
other strong western states such as the United Kingdom. Interestingly, the 
legitimisation of force for hire has historically coincided with a weak state 
system. A state monopoly over legitimate violence does not easily co-exist 
with the private provision of legitimate violence. Perhaps this indicates that the 
state monopoly over legitimate violence is a historical anomaly characteristic 
only of the 20th century, rather than a near-universal truth. 
 
2.2 The emergence of the Private Military Company 
Three late 20th century developments were conducive to the emergence of the 
modern-day PMC: the downsizing of the state; the end of super-power 
patronage for third world states; and the post-Cold War worldwide military 
downsizing. Firstly, a marked change in the role of the state occurred with the 
“privatization revolution”, starting in the US and the UK in the early 1980s. 
Believing that private actors in a competitive market perform more efficiently 
and with less wastage than public actors, many western governments started 
outsourcing or privatizing tasks that were traditionally seen as the 
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responsibility of the state, such as medical care, care for the elderly and public 
transport. Privatization gained momentum, and new tasks and institutions were 
added to the list. The simultaneous reduction in public expenditure created a 
vacuum that private actors were quick to fill.  
 
In terms of the Weberian understanding of the state, the most noticeable result 
of the downsizing of the state is the reduction in police spending and the 
growth in private security guards. In the US, three times as many people work 
for the private security sector as for official law enforcement agencies, and in 
the UK, private domestic security personnel outnumber the British army 
(Singer 2003:69). Up to 80% of all army training in Britain now involves 
civilian contractors in some way (Foreign Office 2002:13). The outsourcing of 
aspects of external military services can be seen as a natural, but not 
uncontroversial extension of the “privatization revolution”. Whereas financial 
deregulation and the membership of supranational institutions may challenge 
the state’s capacity for domestic political control, the outsourcing of defence 
capabilities impinges on what is commonly seen as the most basic function of 
the state – the protection of those inside the state against threats from the 
outside. Thus, a normative shift in the understanding of what role the state 
should play occurred alongside processes of globalization, financial 
deregulation and privatization, partly as an initiating factor for these 
developments and partly as a result of the changes they brought about. This 
new way of looking at the state may explain why the use of PMCs by western 
and non-western governments, humanitarian organizations and multinational 
companies does not raise as many eyebrows as it perhaps would have done 
thirty years ago. It may also account for why the current-day PMCs resemble 
‘normal’ multinational companies and are perceived of by many as legitimate 
business actors, in stark contrast to the mercenary organizations of the 1960s 
and 1970s 
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If a change in the view of the state, occurring mainly in the western world, can 
explain why PMCs gained ground as more or less legitimate actors in world 
affairs, developments in the third world after the Cold War are of key 
importance to understand the role and emergence of PMCs. It is within and 
between third world states that the majority of contemporary violent conflicts 
occur and hence, this part of the world constitutes the main field of action for 
PMC activity (Kaldor 2001:92). The end of the Cold War meant the end of 
superpower patronage. External assistance to third world states, both financial 
and military significantly decreased or disappeared completely. This meant a 
weakening of the capacity of many third world states to maintain a sufficient 
level of external and internal security (Herbst 1997). With small or ill-equipped 
national military and police forces in many states, the chances of insurgencies 
or foreign invasions succeeding increased, and the barriers for initiating violent 
conflicts were lowered. The lack of state capacity for maintaining order 
alongside a rise in the number of violent conflicts in the third world created a 
demand for the services of PMCs. In addition, political unwillingness among 
developed states to provide national forces to help restore law and order in 
developing countries sometimes conflicted with a perceived obligation to help 
out. This has led to instances in which developed countries contract PMCs to 
operate in developing countries on their behalf. Plan Colombia, the US 
government’s military support package to combat drug lords in Colombia, is 
one example of this practice (Hammer 2006).  
 
Third, military downsizing after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the 
Soviet Union alongside the deregulation of international trade has eased the 
availability of weapons. Arms have become available on the open market, 
contributing to “the alteration of the military balance between state and 
society” (Herbst 1997:123), further undermining the state’s capacity to uphold 
internal order and provide external protection. Military equipment and arms are 
the “work tools” of PMCs – without a relatively open weapons market, PMCs 
would have difficulties doing their job. Military downsizing after the Cold War 
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also meant a surplus of military personnel. Highly skilled individuals from 
both developed and underdeveloped states, many of them former members of 
special forces such as the British SAS, the South African 32nd Recon Battalion, 
the Soviet Alpha unit and the KGB were readily available as employees of 
PMCs (Singer 2003:53). 
 
2.3 Characteristics of modern-day PMCs 
The majority of the modern-day PMCs have their administrative origins in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Israel or South Africa. Jane’s Intelligence 
Weekly holds that the defining character of the PMC is its global reach: “the 
core service that defines a private military company is its ability to deploy an 
armed force of former military personnel overseas, for whatever task” 
(McCarthy 2006). Since the 1990s, PMCs have been active on every continent 
but Antarctica (Singer 2003:9). PMCs offer a diverse range of services – from 
the provision of forces for combat, military training and strategic advice to 
demining, logistical support, arms procurement and intelligence gathering and 
monitoring operations. Some PMCs specialize in one of these tasks only, while 
others offer a wider spectrum of military services. The PMC Executive 
Outcomes, for instance, successfully quelled an internal rebellion in Sierra 
Leone in 1996. Another PMC, MPRI trained the Croatian armed forces in 
1994, contributing to their surprising victory over Serb forces in the Krajina 
region in 1995 (Singer 2003:126).  
 
The direct participation in combat is increasingly uncommon, however. In the 
immediate post-Cold War world, the private military market was dominated by 
the governments of weak, developing states seeking military services, often in 
the sharp, offensive end, and by NGOs and multinational companies operating 
in conflict areas in the developing world. Since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th 2001, the services most in demand have been armed protection 
and armed escort services in conflict areas with a significant western 
commercial or military presence, in particular Iraq and Afghanistan. In 
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addition, security-planning and security management for corporations investing 
in the third world forms an important bulk of the PMCs’ revenue (Isenberg 
2004: 20-22).  
 
Current-day PMCs differ from latter-day mercenaries in terms of structure, 
field of action and level of legitimacy. The differences between traditional 
mercenary activity and PMCs are so fundamental that most commentators, 
including the British government place them in different categories (Foreign 
Office 2002). In contrast to mercenaries, PMCs are hierarchically organized 
businesses with a corporate structure. They are “commercial enterprises first 
and foremost”, legal and registered entities that “for the most part trade and 
compete openly, vertically integrated into the wider global marketplace” 
(Singer 2003:45). Latter-day mercenary organizations emerged and dissolved 
along with the wars they fought. In contrast, the existence of PMCs is not 
contingent upon the particular conflicts they are involved in. As corporations, 
they have the financial strength and coherence to exist over time and in 
between missions. Modern-day PMCs are global in reach and can take on 
several contracts at the same time. In contrast to mercenaries, it is the PMC as 
an organization and not the individual soldier that is party to the contract. 
PMCs are virtual companies comparable to temping agencies like Adecco or 
Manpower: they have few permanent employees but draw on individuals from 
a database for their missions. In the words of one commentator, “their model 
isn't "Mad" Mike Hoare, who gained notoriety for his exploits in the Congo 
during the 1960s and in a failed 1981 coup attempt in the Seychelles; it's the 
management consultants of McKinsey & Company” (Weiner 2006).  
 
Many western-based PMCs are subsidiaries of large and diversified 
multinational corporations – the PMC Kellogg, Brown and Root, for instance, 
is a part of the Halliburton group, and MPRI is owned by L-3 – whereas some 
are military companies only. That many people perceive of PMCs as “normal” 
business enterprises is further confirmed by the participation of well-respected 
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individuals in their managerial teams. For instance, the former British Defence 
and Foreign Secretary for the Conservative party, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, is the 
chairman of ArmorGroup, and Vice President Dick Cheney’s leaps between 
Halliburton and politics are familiar to most people. As explained above, 
changes in the view of what role the state should play in society and a widened 
acceptance for the involvement of private actors in what was previously 
considered the state’s exclusive domain further legitimizes the use of PMCs in 
the eyes of many policy-makers. The corporate structure and close 
resemblance to ‘normal’ MNCs has undoubtedly contributed to an increase in 
the acceptance of PMC use. Whereas mercenary activity is forbidden 
according to the Geneva Convention, PMCs fall outside the Convention’s 
definition of mercenaries (Beyani and Lily 2001). Thus, the PMC has to be 
considered a new player in international politics in spite of its kinship ties to 
mercenaries. Unlike mercenaries, PMCs operate openly, and states and non-
state actors openly enter into contracts with them.  
 
2.4 Why has the UK become a stronghold for the private military industry? 
British private military and security companies have, according to Major 
General John Holmes, director of British PMC Erinys, “taken the lion’s share 
of the world’s private security business in recent years” (Almond 2005). It is 
difficult to come across accurate numbers estimating the size of the British 
industry, but with total business revenues of around £1bn, and claims to have 
over twice as many men on the ground in Iraq as their American counterparts, 
British companies are estimated to have the biggest share of private security 
contracts in Iraq, where the largest market currently is (Fisk 2004; The 
Economist 2004). How, then, have the British come to be so dominant in the 
private security market? Three complementary explanations may account for 
the UK’s position: there is a tradition for the use of hired forces in the UK; the 
size and quality of the British military generates a pool of suitable employees 
for PMCs; and lastly privatization and outsourcing in the UK created a home 
market for private security services early on compared to most other countries.  
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2.4.1 A tradition for hired guns.  
There is an old tradition in the UK for letting national for-profit companies 
engage in warfare, and for letting citizens with military expertise sell their 
skills to foreign countries. Arguably, this tradition has been more persistent in 
Britain than in other big European states. The export of military expertise in 
particular, has continued legitimately throughout the 20th century.  
 
One of the most widespread versions of state-sanctioned, for-profit violence in 
early modern times was privateering. The practice is defined in international 
law as one in which “vessels belonging to private owners, sailing under a 
commission of war empowering the person to whom it is granted to carry on 
all forms of hostility which are permissible at sea by the usages of war” 
(Thomson 1994: 22). In effect, this meant that ships with authorization could 
attack ships from hostile nations, loot them, give a share of the loot to the state 
and keep the rest. Privateering reached an all-time high in the UK by the 18th 
century, when big lobbies defending the interests of privateers were formed, 
and privateers were allowed to attack neutral commerce. Just as mercenary 
groups functioned as the initial nucleus of the army, privateers became “both a 
substitute and a foundation for state naval power” (Thomson 1994: 26). 
Similarly, the before-mentioned trading companies, like the English East India 
Company, were private entities permitted by the state to engage in warfare and 
establish colonies. The trading companies lasted well into the 19th century – the 
English East India Company was dissolved in 1874, and the English-chartered 
Hudson’s Bay Company still exists, albeit without its original war-making 
capabilities.  
 
The British army still makes use of foreigners, most famously the Nepalese 
Gurkhas. The Gurkhas were originally part of the military wing of the English 
East India Company. After the Company’s demise, the 1876 Treaty of Segauli 
gave Britain the right to recruit Nepalese subjects into its army, and they still 
do. In May 2003, 3443 Gurkhas were active in the British army (Ministry of 
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Defence 2006). The foreign enlistment act of 1870 made it an offence for 
British soldiers to “accept any commission or engagement in the military or 
naval service of any foreign State at war with any foreign State at peace with 
Her Majesty” (quoted in Walker and Whyte 2005: 655). It was aimed at 
prohibiting British nationals from selling military services abroad so as not to 
pull the UK into conflicts it was not party to, and to avoid strengthening an 
enemy. Yet, British officers have continued to work for foreign armies, also in 
the 20th century. They have, for instance, been employed by the governments 
of the Solomon Islands, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar; the chief of staff 
in Oman was British until 1977, as were most other senior personnel in the 
different Omani military branches (Thomson 1994: 92).  
 
An important reason behind the British military involvement in foreign armies 
is the UK’s imperial past. Firstly, many of the countries that employ British 
servicemen are former colonies or protectorates, where the British military 
presence was a natural extension of colonial responsibilities. Secondly, one can 
speculate that imperialism established a certain habit in the British military for 
finding British global presence natural. Unlike the border-guard soldier 
practices of many other European states in the 20th century, save for France, 
the military islanders of the UK frequently had foreign experience. The 
international connections and experiences may help explain why the first 
modern PMC, WatchGuard International, was British. It was established in the 
1960s by the founder of the SAS6, Colonel Sir David Stirling. Rumoured to be 
working in close cooperation with the MI6, WatchGuard employed former 
SAS-soldiers to train militaries in the Persian Gulf and to assist their operations 
against internal rebels (O’Brien 2000). It quickly expanded, and took contracts 
in Latin America, Africa, and East Asia as well as in the Middle East. As a 
professional corporate structure operating on several continents, WatchGuard 
became the model future PMCs emulated (ibid). 
 
                                                
6
 The Special Air Service (SAS) is a special branch of the British Army 
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Thus, the two main features of the current-day PMC – profit-based soldiering 
and a global presence – have been attributes of the British military tradition for 
centuries. First, there is an acceptance of, and a tradition for a view of the 
military that somehow diverges from the citizen-army tradition that dominates 
in many other western states. The employment of British officers in foreign 
armies is not uncommon, and likewise the British army accepts foreigners, 
such as the Gurkhas, into its ranks. Second, the imperial heritage appears to 
have resulted in a familiarity towards the more remote areas of the globe, 
perhaps coupled with a feeling of having an obligation to “sort things out” in 
the old colonies. Taken together, these aspects of British military history 
constitute fertile ground for the emergence of private military companies. 
 
 
2.4.2 A pool of suitable employees 
Like most companies, PMCs depend on a large pool of qualified labour; people 
with relevant skills that might potentially become employees. Unlike most 
other companies, the type of employee the PMC seeks is not readily available 
in all western countries. Most British PMCs pride themselves in employing 
mainly or solely former members of elite units and the special forces of 
western powers7. In the UK, this means former Special Air Service (SAS) 
soldiers, members of the Special Boat Service (SBS), or former police officers 
from Scotland Yard’s royalty protection squad (SO14) (Isenberg 2004: 24). 
The reason for the popularity of the Special Forces is first and foremost their 
reputation of being high-quality soldiers. In addition to their advanced combat 
training, they are accustomed to working in foreign countries, and language 
skills and “cultural appreciation skills” are a part of their education. The 
presence and availability of Special Forces soldiers and other ex-army 
personnel of high quality is one of the main reasons for why Britain became a 
leading exporter of private security. Thus, the Director of Erinys, Major 
General John Holmes remarks that British PMCs dominate the private security 
                                                
7
 These include, among others, AKE Group, HART Group, ICP Group, and Sabre. Their URLs can be 
found in the bibliography. 
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market, “largely because they have an outstanding reputation” (quoted in 
Almond 2005). 
 
Ex-army and Special Forces personnel are not only essential for the 
recruitment of soldiers to PMCs. Perhaps more importantly, the people 
founding and managing PMCs usually have a military background. Each PMC 
tends to draw the majority of its management staff from a single national 
military culture (Kinsey 2005c, 197). Practically all British PMCs have 
managerial teams consisting of highly decorated ex-soldiers of the British 
Army. PMC Erinys is a case in point, with only one individual in the 10-
member management group not being a former career soldier – the Chief 
Financial Officer (Erinys website). The composition of the management team 
sets the tone for further recruitment, ensuring the prevalence of Special Forces 
mainly and British forces solely in many British PMCs. Furthermore, the 
composition of the management teams may influence the choices they make 
about which tasks to accept. 
 
 
2.4.3 Thatcherism and an emerging market  
In 1979, Margaret Thatcher was elected Prime Minister of the UK. Together 
with the American President Ronald Reagan, she initiated the revival of an 
orthodox form of liberalism, often referred to as neoliberalism (Cohn 2000: 
88). Central to the neoliberal thesis is the belief that the private sector can 
deliver more efficiently and with less wastage than what is possible for the 
public sector. This led to a “rolling back of the state” – the privatization and 
outsourcing of many state activities. Since the 1980s, the British Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) has been “in the vanguard of UK public sector outsourcing” 
(Uttley 2004: 147). Initially, the focus of MoD outsourcing was on the 
procurement of defence-related material and the privatization of the defence 
industry (Halvorsen 2005: 322). The scope and scale of outsourcing and 
privatization gradually extended to include the contracting out of services 
covering military training, logistics and communications (Uttley 2004: 148), 
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and after a while also support for deployed forces, rendering Britain “one of 
the frontrunners in this [the outsourcing of military support services to private 
companies] development” (Krahmann 2005c: 2). Thus, a market for defence 
developed earlier in the UK than in most other western states, encouraging the 
rise of the private security industry.  
 
2.5 Regulation in the UK 
The legal position of British PMCs is ambiguous. Unlike South Africa and the 
US, the UK has no formal regulative measures in place for controlling PMCs, 
and there is in practise no international legislation regulating PMC activities 
(Holmqvist 2005:4). One attempt has been made at developing a legal 
framework for regulating PMCs in the UK. In February 2002, the British 
government published a ‘Green Paper’, a consultation document suggesting 
possible legislative opportunities for regulating the British PMC industry. 
However, not much has happened since. The Green Paper signified that the 
government is aware of the potential impact PMCs can have on international 
security and on British interests abroad, but this was not enough for the 
government to take the full step towards proposing legislation.  
 
This lack of legislation can largely be explained by reference to the extensive 
use of private actors for at-home maintenance, logistics and training, coupled 
with the view that business does best on its own, without state interference. 
Indeed, Peter January, the Foreign Office official responsible for drafting PMC 
legislation believes that regulation is unlikely to appear anytime soon. 
According to January, strong forces in the government oppose all kinds of 
regulation of commercial activities. Moreover, it is “hard to make the 
government understand that the security industry is not like any old 
commercial activity” (January 2006 [Interview]). In addition, it is difficult to 
develop effective regulation for global phenomena like PMCs. Especially 
tricky is the enforcement side to regulation. Everything the companies do occur 
outside British territory, and ensuring that no laws are broken would require 
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the implementation of expensive and time consuming oversight mechanisms. 
Furthermore, any strict regulation of the companies could result in them 
redeploying abroad, as has happened with many South African PMCs, leaving 
the government with even slimmer chances of keeping an eye on the industry 
(Beyani and Lilly 2001, 32).  
 
2.6 Self-regulation by PMCs 
Possibly as a step towards improving their reputation, British PMCs formed a 
trade association, the British Association of Private Security Companies 
(BAPSC), in February 2006. According to the BAPSC charter, their purpose is 
to “promote, enhance and regulate the interests and activities of UK-based 
firms and companies that provide armed security services in countries outside 
the UK” (BAPSC Charter 2006). By doing this, the British PMC industry 
hopes to quell the government’s plans for legislative regulation and instead 
enforce a form of self-regulation by threatening to expel member companies 
that do not follow the BAPSC code of conduct (Holmes 2006 [interview]). 
However, one can question the effectiveness of self-regulation. Peter January 
of the Foreign Office does not believe self-regulation through a trade 
association will be an efficient means to preventing companies doing damage 
to British interests, referring to the fate of the American equivalent, IPOA, 
which, according to January, has become a lobbying organ more than anything 
else (January 2006 [interview]).  
 
Nevertheless, without formal regulation, all the British government can rely on 
in relation to British PMCs is the willingness of the companies themselves to 
abide by norms for proper conduct. In this regard, the only concrete material 
the companies have giving an indication of the government’s interests is the 
official UK sanctions regime, published on the Foreign Office website. It was 
the controversies in the aftermath of the PMC Sandline’s affairs in Sierra 
Leone and Papua New Guinea that led to the Green Paper and the initial 
debates about PMCs among British politicians. Seven years later, the PMC 
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industry has experienced a formidable growth in scope and revenue while the 
debates have gone quiet, and so, it appears, have the efforts to develop a 
regulative framework for PMCs.  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
Although the presence of “force for hire” has deep historical roots, the PMC 
phenomenon is in many respects different from previous private force 
wielders. Today’s PMCs differ from the ancient mercenary armies and the 
more recent privateers and trading companies in that they exist alongside a 
more or less globally consolidated state system. And, they differ from the ad-
hoc, villain mercenary of the 20th century in terms of the legitimacy and 
normality PMCs are viewed with, if not among the general public, then at least 
among the states and corporations that hire them. The PMC industry has a 
strong foothold in the UK. A significant share of the world’s PMCs has their 
headquarters in London, and reports indicate that a majority of the PMCs in 
Iraq are British (Isenberg 2004). In spite of its phenomenal growth in recent 
years, the UK-based private military industry remains unregulated. Whether or 
not some form of self-regulation is sufficient to prevent PMCs from engaging 
in activities looked unfavourably upon by the government will be explored in 
the following chapters. 
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Chapter Four 
PMCs and British Interests: Conflict or Convergence? 
 
Some of the people commenting on PMCs make pessimistic predictions 
concerning the possible implications of having a “market for force”. In general, 
commentators worry that “an unintended consequence [of using PMCs] can be 
that private contractors pursue their own self-interests and thereby embarrass 
political authorities” (Østerud 2005: 101). Some express a concern that the use 
of PMCs “may lead to a situation where any government in a difficult position 
can hire mercenaries to stay in power” (Herbst 1998: 323). Moreover, “there is 
the risk that PMCs will shift sides in the middle of a conflict” or even “turn 
against their employers and work for their overthrow by a ruler more sensitive 
to their own concerns” (Leander 2003: 6). These statements are in line with the 
expectations of rational choice theory, and underscore what last chapter 
suggested – that PMCs generally are thought to be goal-driven profit-
maximisers, seeking monetary gain at any cost. This chapter will attempt to 
find out how relevant explanations like these are in the British context. It will 
go in-depth in the available empirical material on PMCs in order to establish 
whether British PMC behaviour conflicts or converges with British foreign 
policy. The chapter will begin by setting the confines of the question: What, 
exactly, is meant by British interests with regards to the conduct of British-
based PMCs? Second, the empirical evidence will be put forward. Examples of 
conflicting and converging behaviour will be presented and analysed, and a 
conclusion will be drawn establishing what the dominating tendency for British 
PMC behaviour is.   
 
 
4.1 Setting the confines of the question 
What is meant by “convergence with or divergence from British interests” 
needs some further clarification. It is necessary to define what is meant by 
British interests with regards to PMC conduct, and what type of behaviour 
would be seen to undermine these interests. To get a clearer picture of what is 
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meant by British interests in relation to the PMC phenomenon, one has to look 
at the political context. Foreign policy in the post-Cold War era is not merely 
about fulfilling some clearly stated, self-interested goal, such as winning an 
ally or securing beneficial trade relations. As Tony Blair made evident through 
his “Cool Britannia” campaign, foreign policy is also about ensuring a 
favourable national image abroad. New Labour wanted to re-brand the UK and 
remove the post-World War II image of a stuffy, fallen imperialist by re-
launching the country as a progressive, ethically concerned nation (Kampfner 
2003: 71). The slogans were numerous. The UK would be “a force for good; a 
friend of democracy; at the heart of Europe” (Williams 2004: 921). Further, 
“its ethical dimension would go beyond narrow realpolitik; it would put the 
promotion of human rights at the heart of its diplomacy, and find a third way 
between capitalism and socialism” (ibid).  
 
This concern with reputation and international standing affects the 
government’s relationship with the PMC industry as well. A report by the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs is illustrative in this 
respect: “[m]any of the countries in which PMCs are based are key players in 
the world arena and thus can find these companies a political embarrassment” 
(House of Commons 2002:point 5.2). According to the report, the government 
fears that PMCs “could have, and in some cases would have an adverse impact 
on the implementation of its foreign policy objectives”, as “currently these 
companies have no formal link to their home government but can operate in 
areas that affect British foreign policy” (ibid, point 2.2.2). In a similar vein, 
Peter January, the UK Foreign Office official responsible for PMC-related 
issues, argues that the main worry of the government with regards to PMCs is 
the prospect of PMC behaviour being seen as the extension of UK foreign 
policy (January 2006 [interview]). Thus, the government’s fears appear to stem 
from the understanding that the private security industry’s activities resemble 
the activities usually confined to states, and consequently, privately employed 
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British men wearing a soldier’s uniform may be mistaken as publicly 
employed British soldiers.  
 
The Foreign Office’s 2002 Green Paper was a comprehensive study of the 
potential advantages and pitfalls involved with hosting an unregulated PMC 
industry. As it was commissioned and approved by the British government, 
and even contains a foreword written by the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, 
this thesis will consider the Green Paper to be the most explicit expression of 
the Government’s relationship with the PMC industry. Therefore, the 
stipulations spelled out in the Green Paper concerning the potential problems 
an unregulated PMC industry could result in will form the basis for the criteria 
against which the actions of British PMCs will be compared. The Green Paper 
holds that:  
• Activity in this area [the private use of force] by individuals or companies 
could cut across Britain’s foreign policy objectives. 
• British forces could find themselves confronting forces which had been 
assisted by a British company. This contingency is not as remote as it might 
seem. In a world in which know-how is as important as hardware, consultancy 
and training abroad may have a significant impact. The techniques used by 
Special Forces, for example, are often highly classified. 
• Activity by British companies will also reflect on Britain’s reputation. 
Whatever the facts of any particular action, there are always likely to be people 
who will assume that if a British company is involved then it has some degree of 
approval from the Government. At the minimum, therefore, perceptions of 
British policy will be affected and there will be a risk of misinterpretation. 
• A major operation abroad by a British PMC might put British lives at risk. 
Could the British Government be obliged to intervene if such an operation went 
badly wrong? (Foreign Office 2002:21. Bolds as in original version) 
 
The first bullet point, the concern that “companies could cut across British 
foreign policy objectives” is further specified in the Green Paper. Briefly 
summed up, it involves a) a fear that PMCs may adversely impact on peace, 
security and conflict resolution; b) a fear that they contravene human rights; 
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and c) a fear that they engage in illegal pursuits (Kinsey 2005b:88; Foreign 
Office 2002:18-20). Adding on to this, Peter January emphasises that the 
Foreign Office in some instances will look unfavourably on the mere presence 
of British private security personnel in unstable countries, even when the 
security personnel are not carrying arms. As an example, he refers to an 
incident in which a British PMC was planning to send men to a West African 
country to train local forces, to which the Foreign Office would have objected 
if it had had any say in the matter (January 2006 [interview])8.  The second and 
fourth bullet points – proposing a confrontation between British forces and 
British PMCs, or the rescuing of British PMC personnel by British forces – has 
not yet happened, and are not immediately relevant for this paper’s research 
question. Point three, however, is highly relevant. The general undermining of 
the UK’s international reputation is a big hat category with ambiguous 
standards of measurement. It corresponds to the UK’s new ethical foreign 
policy image; anything that might tarnish the UK’s appearance is 
objectionable.  
 
In sum, then, the list of activities that would be looked upon unfavourably by 
the Foreign Office is comprehensive, and as a result rather vague. Yet, it can 
be summarized into five concrete standards. Drawing on the stipulations in the 
Green Paper and the concerns of the Foreign Office as expressed by Peter 
January, one can conclude that a PMC is in conflict with British foreign policy 
interests if it is found: a) aiding governments that are not seen as friendly 
nations by the British government; and related, b) aiding governments with a 
dismal human rights record; c) committing criminal offences, such as breaking 
an arms embargo; and lastly, and more woolly, d) deploying soldiers to regions 
where there is an imminent danger that the presence of PMC personnel could 
contribute to further destabilization or e) being a political embarrassment to the 
UK. As some of these points are rather ambiguous and hard to pin down, this 
thesis will add a final criterion of official response. In other words, it will 
                                                
8
 The incident he is referring to involves the British company Northbridge, and will be discussed below 
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consider a PMC to be in conflict with British foreign policy interests if one of 
its activities falls within any of these standards, and the activity results in some 
form of negative reaction from the government. 
 
4.2 Do British PMCs take British interests into account? 
Like the Special Forces, the military units that have been the recruiting 
grounds for many PMCs, the PMC industry has by and large been cloaked in 
secrecy with regards to their clients and contracts. In the words of one 
commentator, the former soldiers working for PMCs “have been brought up on 
a diet of ‘need to know’ information management. Their subjective approach to 
outsiders is by default one of secrecy” (Cummins 2002: 5). Yet, complete 
secrecy is hard to achieve, as the industry does not operate in isolation. Reports 
from journalists, NGOs and the UN, as well as academic research on the 
subject all help map the activities of individual PMCs. Moreover, people 
within the security industry have in recent years seen the value of increased 
transparency as a step towards boosting their own legitimacy. Thus, it has been 
possible to draw a general conclusion to the question of whether British PMCs 
normally choose to abstain from activities that may conflict with the interests 
of the UK government. 
 
Compared to the size and revenue of the British PMC industry, there are very 
few examples of British PMCs taking contracts that have caused controversy in 
the British government9. Out of the 39 British-based PMCs included in this 
study, only three companies have been involved in operations that 
subsequently have received negative reactions from the British government, 
numbering in total four controversial incidents10. These companies have come 
close to disturbing, or have disturbed, a fragile peace, as in the incidents 
involving Sandline in Papua New Guinea and Northbridge in the Ivory Coast; 
                                                
9
 This statement is supported by some academic works on PMCs (Avant 2005:175; Kinsey 2003); 
unsurprisingly by the industry itself (interviews with Nicholas Melson of ArmorGroup and John 
Holmes of Erinys, company websites and statements, Spicer 2000); by Peter January of the Foreign 
Office (interview 7/2/06) and by my own research. 
10
 A list over all 39 British-based PMCs, each company’s core competencies and an example of an 
operation the company has been involved in can be found in the appendix.  
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broken an arms embargo, as Sandline did in its Sierra Leone mission; or aided 
foreign governments considered unfriendly by the UK government, as Avient 
did in its operations in DR Congo and Zimbabwe. But, the majority of 
contracts taken by British PMCs do not fall within the criteria spelled out 
above as being in conflict with British interests.  
 
The low number of PMCs embarking on contracts with what can be called 
controversial clients is, in all probability, not caused by a lack of such offers. 
Several PMC representatives confirm that they sometimes decline contracts for 
what they refer to as “ethical reasons” (Melson 2006, [interview]). For 
example, the PMC Northbridge tells of being offered a deal with Liberian 
rebels. In an interview with The Telegraph newspaper, the Northbridge 
director, Pasquale DiPofi, claims that “we have held talks with the rebels and 
they offered to give us business deals in Liberia in return for help in defeating 
Taylor”. Further, Mr DiPofi assures that “We don't want to do that. 
Commercial concessions have given the industry a bad name.” (La Guardia, 
2003). Representatives of Armorgroup, Erinys and Sandline tell of being 
offered contracts that they have declined for similar reasons (Melson 2006 
[interview]; Holmes 2006 [interview]; Spicer 2000, 159). In a statement to the 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ArmorGroup asserts that  
ArmorGroup has turned down requests to provide pipeline security in a 
country where there was perceived to be a conflict with human rights; to 
transport gold and diamonds where the matter of ownership was unclear; to 
investigate individuals where to do so would break the law; and to supply 
non-lethal equipment to governments, where there was a chance that they 
may be used to suppress democratic movements (House of Commons 2002). 
 
4.3 The controversial incidents 
The four controversial incidents uncovered in this study have in common that 
they all involved working for, or in support of, governmental clients in the 
third world. This section will give an account of each episode, and demonstrate 
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why these cases can be considered to be diverging from British interests, as 
they have been defined above. 
 
It was the controversies around the 1998 Arms-to-Africa affair, in which the 
British PMC Sandline (now defunct) broke a UN arms embargo that first 
brought the significance of PMCs to the British government’s attention 
(Kinsey 2003:52; Foreign Office 2002). Following the Sierra Leonean civil 
war and subsequent coup d’etat, Sandline was contracted by a Thai 
businessman with commercial interests in Sierra Leone to assist the exiled 
government of President Kabbah. Sandline proposed a military plan according 
to which they would help government-friendly paramilitary groupings in 
driving out the junta, and then restore the rule of the Kabbah government. As a 
step towards fulfilling this plan, Sandline arranged the purchase of about 1000 
AK 47’s, mortars, light machine guns and ammunition from Bulgaria (Kinsey 
2003:73). However, Sierra Leone was at the time subject to a UN arms 
embargo, and the weapons were confiscated by Nigerian peacekeepers. In May 
1998, the British government announced that it would launch an investigation 
into the affair.  
 
The incident received widespread media coverage in the UK, and was dubbed 
a scandal in light of the foreign secretary Robin Cook’s emphasis on leading an 
ethical foreign policy. Accordingly, Dr Dennis MacShane, the Under-Secretary 
of State in the Foreign Office commented that “many things embarrass the 
United Kingdom and I can assure you as a PPS [Parliamentary Private 
Secretary] in the Foreign Office, the Sandline Sierra Leone affair was 
something that was not only embarrassing but I would say quite damaging to 
the Government at the time” (House of Commons 2002). It is first and 
foremost the contravention of the arms embargo that makes this episode 
controversial from the British government’s perspective. But, the scale of the 
turmoil following the episode was in all likeliness also caused by the newness 
of the PMC phenomena, and the reflexive contempt felt by many at the thought 
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of British mercenaries operating in Africa. Moreover, it demonstrated the 
potential pitfalls of leaving the private military industry unregulated, and 
sparked off the first debates on regulation in the UK.  
 
The Arms to Africa affair is not the only example of Sandline embarking on a 
mission that can be seen as controversial by the UK government. In 1997, in 
the face of guerrilla warfare on the Papua New Guinean (PNG) island of 
Bougainville, Sandline was contracted by the PNG government. It was hired to 
train the PNG forces, gather intelligence on the rebels, and thereafter conduct 
offensive operations to strike down on the insurgents, retake control over the 
island’s copper mine and provide any necessary follow-up support (Singer 
2003:194). However, the contract, which was rather costly, was signed without 
giving notice to the PNG parliament and without public discussion. When the 
underpaid PNG military leaders found out about it, they committed mutiny, 
ignited a public outrage that led to mass demonstrations in the capital, and 
eventually forced the regime to resign (Spicer 2000:150-188). Sandline never 
completed its PNG mission.  
 
The episode was not well received in Australia, PNG’s principal military aid 
donor. The Australians had placed conditions on the types of weapons and 
training it would give its client, a principle rendered ineffective by Sandline’s 
involvement. Consequently, the episode caused Australia to file a diplomatic 
complaint to Britain over the meddling of British mercenaries in what 
Australia perceived as its sphere of influence (Halvorsen 2005:347). Speaking 
of the PNG-Sandline incident, Dennis MacShane of the Foreign Office states 
that “it was embarrassing to the United Kingdom, and it certainly aggravated 
our friends in the region, Australia, New Zealand and other countries” (House 
of Commons 2002:point 160). Thus, British interests as broadly defined were 
undermined in two ways. First, Sandline’s involvement in an unstable country 
contributed to further unrest, even without the mission being completed. 
Second, the British government was implicated and embarrassed in front of a 
  -52- 
 
close ally, a worry expressed throughout the Green Paper, and one that relates 
to the post-Cold War concern with reputation and international standing. 
 
Had Sandline consulted with the British Foreign Office before taking any of 
these two contracts, the Foreign Office would probably have tried to dissuade 
them from doing so (Kinsey 2003:23; January 2006 [interview]). The same is 
true for some of the missions of the British PMCs Northbridge and Avient. In 
the spring of 2003, British media reported that Northbridge was planning to 
hire several-hundred security personnel to help the government of the Ivory 
Coats quell an insurgency (BBC news 2003; Northbridge website). The 
Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, exerted strong pressure on the company not to 
fulfil the contract. In interviews, Straw said that he was “gravely concerned at 
reports that Northbridge was recruiting ex-servicemen from Britain, South 
Africa and France to work in the Ivory Coast” (quoted in BBC News 2003). 
Furthermore, “any deployment of foreign military units at this time would 
seriously undermine the peace process and the efforts of the UK and the wider 
international community" (ibid). In the event, Northbridge ended up not going 
to the Ivory Coast, but in all likeliness for reasons to do with the company’s 
financial situation, not as a result of the attitude of the Foreign Office (Kinsey 
2003: 23; January 2006 [interview]). For that reason, the Northbridge incident 
is included in this thesis as an example of a company acting in conflict with 
British foreign policy. As Straw indicates in his comment, it is the fear that 
Northbridge might undermine a fragile peace and halt the peace process that 
makes this episode controversial. The civil war in the Ivory Coast, a former 
French colony, broke out in September 2002 after a rebel group seized control 
over the northern half of the country. However, a peace deal was quickly 
brokered by France, a power-sharing government was appointed, and a 
ceasefire implemented with the help of French troops (The Economist 2003b). 
In addition, the vocal reaction from the British government could imply that a 
the government was concerned about not annoying an ally – France – by 
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meddling in its sphere of influence, and thus repeating the embarrassments of 
the Sandline-PNG incident.  
 
Another British company, Avient, was reported to the UK Department for 
Trade and Industry (DTI) by the UN Expert Panel on the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) for violating the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises when operating in the DRC in 2002. The UN Panel specifically 
accused Avient of providing military supplies to both the Congolese Army and 
the Zimbabwe Defence Force, and “thus contributing to conflict in the area” 
(DTI 2004). Avient allegedly provided crews for aeroplanes and helicopters 
used in offensive action in the DRC, and brokered the sale of six military 
helicopters to the DRC government (DTI 2004). Avient denied having supplied 
equipment for the Zimbabwean or Congolese militaries, but concede that they 
did carry commercial cargo and delivered services to both state armies, 
including aviation crews (ibid). According to The Guardian newspaper, one 
Avient contract signed by DRC president Jospeh Kabila states that “The crew 
will be advised that they will be operating along and behind enemy lines in 
support of ground troops and against invading forces. It is specifically agreed 
that the crew will undertake airdropping missions” (Barnett and Harris 2002). 
The DTI did not penalize the company, stating that “the purpose of the 
Guidelines is not to act as an instrument of sanction nor to hold any company 
to account” (DTI 2004).  
 
Avient is responsible for three of the above-mentioned violations on British 
foreign policy interests. First, Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe is not considered to 
be on friendly-nation terms with the UK, and aiding the Zimbabwean 
government would therefore be seen as disloyal by the British government. 
Second, the political situation in the DRC was unstable, and the British Foreign 
Office had previously insisted that the conflict could not be solved by military 
means (Parker et al, 2001). Thus, Avient’s involvement risked contributing to 
the escalation of the conflict. Third, the European Union implemented an arms 
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embargo against the DRC in 1993, well before Avient’s operations (Parker et 
al, 2001). As a result, Avient would have been in breech of British sanctions 
regime if the UN Panel were correct in its allegations that Avient supplied 
military equipment to the DRC. 
 
4.4 Examples of PMC-foreign policy convergence   
The incidents above are, however, not typical of the British PMC industry 
overall. For the most part, British PMCs avoid working for states that regularly 
commit human rights violations or are on unfriendly terms with the UK, avoid 
breaking laws, and are hesitant about deploying personnel to unstable regions. 
In fact, the research conducted in conjunction with this study supports the 
claim that “British PMCs have generally supported British foreign policy 
goals” (Avant 2005: 173).  
 
For example, British PMCs enable the British private sector to operate in 
dangerous areas overseas. In the post-Cold War era, western companies have 
increasingly made investments in the developing world, and often in areas 
where the state is too weak to provide adequate security for its inhabitants. 
Especially prone to operating in areas like this is the oil sector. Oil companies 
cannot choose to avoid dangerous places – the presence of oil determines their 
area of operation, and other considerations will take a subordinate role. 
Working in the oil-rich states of Nigeria, Colombia and Iraq, for example, is 
risky and requires special security precautions. Here, PMCs come in useful. 
The British PMC Defence Systems Limited protects oil facilities for BP in 
Colombia (DSL website), and the ICP Group helped rescue two British oil 
workers kidnapped in Colombia (ICP Group website). The PMC Rubicon 
provided security for mine and oil companies in Africa, among them BP 
extracting oil in Nigeria (Rubicon website), and Northbridge claims to have 
helped rescue British and American oil workers taken hostage by Nigerian 
workers on strike (Northbridge website). Commentators agree that it would 
have been impossible for western commercial companies to contribute to 
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reconstruction efforts in Iraq without the help of PMCs (Isenberg 2006). AD 
consultancy, BritAm Defence, Global Risk International and Henderson Risk 
are among the many British PMCs providing security for private entities in 
Iraq. The companies offer static site security, as Erinys does protecting Iraqi oil 
and gas pipelines, close protection for individuals, as Henderson Risk does, 
and convoy protection, offered by, among others, Decision Strategies Vance 
and Global Risk International. Doing this, British PMCs are not only in line 
with British politics; they help further one of Britain’s most important foreign 
policy goals, namely the promotion of British commercial interests abroad 
(Williams 2004: 911). 
 
NGOs and UN agencies resemble oil companies in the sense that they too 
operate in conflict zones, and therefore in many cases are dependent on the 
private market for security. Aegis provided security support for the UN 
Electoral Assistance division (UNEAD) and the Independent Electoral 
Commission Iraq (IECI) to enable the constitutional referendum in Iraq in 
October 2005 and the General Election in December 2005 (Aegis website). 
Similarly, Global Risk Strategies was contracted by the UN to provide security 
for the Afghani elections. Among the companies announcing on their websites 
that they have internationally recognized NGOs on their client lists are 
ArmorGroup, Blue Sky, Control Risks, Erinys, Global Risk Strategies, GD4, 
HART and TASK. Furthermore, humanitarian assistance has assumed an 
increasingly important role as one of the services offered by PMCs. For 
example, ArmorGroup has been contracted by the UN to remove landmines in 
Mozambique, Cyprus and Bosnia (ArmorGroup Annual Report 2004). In 
2002-2003, the PMC Blue Sky was contracted by the Geneva-based Henri 
Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue to monitor the ceasefire between the 
Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government in Aceh (Bue Sky 
website). From the point of view of the ethical foreign policy stance taken by 
the Blair-government, British PMCs enabling humanitarian NGOs and UN 
agencies is not only unproblematic, but furthers stated policy goals. 
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Many PMCs offer the training of police forces or military personnel. For 
example, TASK International lists an impressive number of countries whose 
forces they have trained, including Cyprus, Malaysia, Russia, South Africa, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and “some Middle Eastern states” (TASK 
website). Several British PMCs have trained Afghani or Iraqi forces, among 
them Global Risk International and ArmorGroup. Saladin has trained Omani 
forces alongside British Army personnel (Shearer 1998: 69). Moreover, in 
1986, the British government loaned money to Mozambique so that they could 
hire the British PMC Defence Systems Ltd to train their army (Avant 2005: 
171). Once again, the activities of British PMCs fall neatly within what is 
considered to be in line with British interests. The training of third world forces 
by British military personnel – private of public – is among other things 
believed to increase the awareness of human rights and the Geneva Protocol in 
third world armies (House of Commons 2002). Thus, the training of military 
and police forces in friendly states in the developing world is not merely a 




British PMCs have for the most part avoided taking contracts that could be 
seen as controversial by the UK Foreign Office. Even though the replacement 
of state soldiers by private contractors in itself may raise problematic moral 
and political questions, the actual jobs PMCs are hired to do are in general 
rather mundane. Common PMC tasks include the static guarding of business 
premises, pipelines or mines in the developing world; personal protection of 
VIPs and professionals or humanitarian aid workers in dangerous areas of the 
world; convoy protection; logistics, and humanitarian assistance such as 
deminig. In the end, only three British PMCs – Sandline, Avient and 
Northbridge – have been able to cause controversy in British governmental 
departments because of their contracts. Out of these three, Sandline closed 
down as the result of the controversies, and Northbridge never carried out the 
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contracts in question, though for reasons other than the government’s 
objections. These incidents share some significant traits. First, they were all 
combat-style operations that had the potential to affect the outcome of a war. 
Second, they all occurred in weak third world countries plagued by civil unrest. 
All in all, most British PMCs stay in line with British foreign policy interests 
as broadly defined most of the time. This is true in spite of the lack of any 
formal regulation of company activity, and in spite of the companies having a 
financial incentive to pursue any contract being offered them. This begs the 
question of why the British PMC industry does not roam wild in a global hunt 
for the highest bidder, as rational choice theory and many commentators 
appear to expect. The following chapter will examine this question by 
discussing how appropriate the different explanations for PMC behaviour 
proposed in Chapter Two are in light of the empirical material presented in this 
chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
Explaining PMC behaviour 
 
The previous chapter established that British PMCs are inclined towards 
staying in line with British foreign policy interests. In other words, British 
PMCs tend to avoid certain types of contracts, despite not being legally obliged 
to doing so. This chapter will look into some of the reasons for why this might 
be. The premise behind this analysis is the proposal that a PMC’s clients and 
operations can reveal something about the relationship the PMC has to its 
home government. Several incidents of PMC conduct being in conflict with the 
government’s foreign policies indicate that the state has little political, 
legislative, commercial or value-based influence over the PMC industry. On 
the other hand, when there are few incidents of conflicting behaviour, as this 
thesis has found, one can assume that one or more of these factors restrict PMC 
behaviour.  
 
This chapter will assess how well the different lines of explanation for PMC 
behaviour proposed in Chapter Two fit the empirical data on British PMCs. 
First, it will look into a crude version of rational choice theory. Second, an 
amended version of rationalist theorizing, which includes factors specific to the 
PMC context, will be considered. Third, the chapter will examine a non-
rationalist explanation drawing on ‘the logic of appropriateness’. Importantly, 
it is worth noting that this examination will fall short of stating something 
definite about the motivations of PMCs. Nor does it include all the possible 
considerations that may form the backdrop to PMC decision-making. The mere 
aim is to compare certain hypothetical avenues of PMC conduct drawn from 
different behavioural theories with the empirical conduct and statements of 
PMCs. Doing this, one will gain greater insights into the conditions and 
rationale behind PMC behaviour, hoping that these insights can tell us 
something about the long-term prospects of the industry.  
 
  -59- 
 
5.1 Rational Choice Theory and PMC Behaviour 
Rational choice theory can be summarized in one simple sentence: When faced 
with several courses of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to 
have the best overall outcome (Elster 1989: 22). Rational choice theory is 
instrumental; actions are “valued and chosen not for themselves, but as more or 
less efficient means to a further end” (ibid). For commercial companies, this 
premise normally equals the principle of profit maximising. Thus, economists 
traditionally assume that a firm’s central objective is to maximize economic 
profits (Frank 1991:329; Waltz 1986:66). Accordingly, rational choice theory, 
which is the basic premise of economic theorizing, would expect PMCs to take 
any contract provided the financial gains outweigh the costs. Behind this 
expectation lies the premise that “to be rational means to make decisions 
according to the cost-benefit criterion – that is, to take an action if and only if 
its benefits exceed its costs” (Frank 1991:17). The initial stages of this analysis 
assume a crude understanding of rational choice theory. Hence, the concept of 
costs and benefits will be limited to financial profits. The possibility that costs 
and benefits may take a non-monetary form will be considered subsequently. 
 
The previous chapter’s findings contradict the expectation that PMCs are 
single-minded profit maximisers. Rather than accepting any profitable contract, 
available data indicate that British companies decline potentially profitable but 
ethically dubious jobs, despite not being legally obliged to doing so (see pp 53-
54 of this thesis). For instance, it is not rational in the crude profit-maximising 
sense for ArmorGroup to turn down requests to provide pipeline security in a 
country because of the country’s dire human rights record, as the company 
reportedly has done (House of Commons 2002). Nor was it strictly speaking 
rational for Sandline to decline a contract offered by the former Zairian 
president Mobutu. Sandline’s Tim Spicer writes of Mobutu that he was not at 
the time on any UN embargo list, and therefore, there was no reason not to talk 
to him (Spicer 2000:159). Yet, Spicer came to the conclusion that “although 
we were offered a great deal of money to help him, we decided not to touch it 
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and pulled out” (ibid). Similarly, Northbridge claims to have turned down a 
potentially profitable contract in Liberia because the company didn’t want to 
work for non-state groups engaged in violent conflict (LaGuardia 2003).  
 
In fact, many of the jobs done by PMCs abroad, such as the protection of 
British business professionals and NGO personnel, or humanitarian work such 
as demining, can be said to implicitly help further British foreign policy goals. 
Unless all profitable missions converge with British foreign policy – which the 
controversial incidents, as well as the refuted offers of contracts mentioned 
above show is highly unlikely – the inclination towards convergence with 
British interests weakens the hypothesis suggesting that PMCs are profit-
driven actors solely. This is not the same as claiming that PMCs disregard the 
profit-motive completely. Clearly, making a profit is the overriding concern for 
any commercial company, including PMCs. But, their avoidance of certain 
types of clients indicates that other influences might play in as well. This 
interpretation of rational choice theory is narrow and rather crude. It does not 
take into account how structural factors may have an effect on PMC activities, 
and assumes a short-term perspective on profit maximising. In other words, it 
is ignorant of the possibility that avoiding controversial clients and missions 
can be a rational means towards the end of profit maximisation. 
 
5.2 Alternative explanations: Rationality refined 
If one throws the ideals of simplicity and generalizability overboard, and 
includes traits specific to the PMC industry, the rationalist model may still 
yield useful insights. Factors specific to the PMC context, such as changes in 
market structure and a concern for reputation can reconcile the PMC’s 
avoidance of certain “unethical” contracts with rational-egoistic assumptions 
about behaviour. Doing this, the chapter abandons any attempt at adhering to 
theory. Instead, the explanation is driven by assumptions drawn from empirical 
observations, while still accepting Elster’s dictum that “to be rational is to do 
as well for oneself as one can” (1989:28). Two types of influences will be 
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considered: First, the effects of the structural environment within which PMCs 
operate will be evaluated. This is not a behavioural factor, and therefore will 
not challenge rational choice per se. Yet, structural factors like this one are 
important because they set the premises for what actors can and cannot do. 
Second, a behavioural factor, namely the PMC’s concern for its own reputation 
will be included in the explanation. An explanation that includes factors like 
these can be seen as an eclectic version of the initial hypothesis stipulating 
PMCs as instrumentally rational actors. PMC behaviour is still guided by 
external incentives and PMCs are still concerned with maximising financial 
gains and minimizing losses. Yet, profit-seeking behaviour is restrained by, 
and filtered through other factors, in this case market structure and a concern 
for the company’s reputation. The following section will consider the relative 
significance of each of these factors in turn, starting with market structure. 
 
5.2.1 Market structure: Security-political changes and the emergence of new 
markets 
There are several indications that changes in global security policy during the 
course of the past few years have steered the industry towards a type of 
contract that is likely to be seen as respectable by the British Foreign Office. In 
other words, the structure of the market for private security, which is shaped by 
global security-political developments, appears to steer PMCs away from 
contracts and clients that may be seen as controversial. First, before September 
11th 2001, more PMCs worked close to the tip of the spear, offensive side of 
military operations than today (McCarthy 2006). In spite of the fact that the 
industry boomed in 2002, and that one therefore would expect growth in all 
sectors, British PMCs’ online profiles go a long way in confirming the claim 
that “[t]he combat sector of the market forms a small and shrinking area of 
endeavour” (Cummins 2002: 8) 11. Second, more PMCs worked for weak, third 
world governments before 2002 than what is the case at present. Both 
offensive operations and “weak state” clients increase the chances of Foreign 
                                                
11
 A list of UK PMC websites can be found in the appendix. 
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Office misgivings. The controversial incidents presented in the previous 
chapter all involved weak state clients – Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, the 
Ivory Coast and DR Congo – and three of the operations – Sandline’s 
involvement in Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea, and Avient’s in DR 
Congo – were close to the “tip of the spear”.   
 
The decline in weak-state clients and the decline in offensive-military 
operations appear to be interlinked. As the type of service offered tends to 
depend on the contract and not on the specific PMC (Avant 2005: 170), one 
can assume that the change in the operational theatre – typically from Sierra 
Leone to Iraq – and type of customer – similarly, from the Sierra Leonean 
government-in-exile to the Pentagon – accounts for the decline in combat-
support missions. Whereas the greatest demand for PMC services used to come 
from weak African states, today the greatest demand for PMCs is in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Leander 2004; Isenberg 2006). The contracts available tend to be 
with either the US government or with commercial companies participating in 
the reconstruction of the two countries, and here the work asked for is likely to 
be in the rear-end, defensive form of military service – armed guarding, close 
protection, and to an increasing degree rescuing hostages, “kidnapping 
management” in PMC parlance (Singer 2005). This does not entail that the 
third-world, combat-end of the market has disappeared, but that PMCs show a 
preference for these new markets. The PMCs abandonment of the old markets 
may indeed leave a void for new actors to fill. The PMCs’ preference for the 
new markets can be explained by reference to profit-related concerns. The 
potential clients in Iraq and Afghanistan are in a far better economic situation 
than are the governments of impoverished African, Latin American or Asian 
states. PMCs operating in the developing world have often been paid in the 
form of mine concessions or other natural resources, tying the company to the 
state and inhibiting cash flow for years to come (Singer 2003; House of 
Commons 2002:point 2.2.3). This is true for Sandline’s Papua New Guinea 
mission and the South African PMC Executive Outcomes’ operations in 
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Angola and Sierra Leone, among others. Western clients pay in hard currency, 
fulfil their contractual obligations and pay well, and are therefore more 
attractive as clients than third world states (Spicer 2000: 115). 
 
Thus, the work done for western governments and corporations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is less likely to fall within the wide definition of PMC behaviour 
that the Foreign Office would consider unfavourable. As Jonathan Garratt, the 
managing director of Erinys explains,  
In Iraq the rules are clear because the authorities have set up guidelines for 
private security firms. The rules of engagement are that guards only open fire 
in self-defence or to protect lives. In other parts of the world, things are not so 
black and white. In countries where there is no government, where there has 
been regime change, we need international regulation (quoted in Hirst 2004).  
Peter January of the Foreign Office supports the observation that changes in 
the market have made controversies less probable: “Iraq and Afghanistan have 
created opportunities for legitimate operations in the service of reliable 
customers. Frankly, that’s where the money is now, and there’s respectable 
money to be made” (January 2006 [interview]). Even though the Foreign 
Office stays uninformed about the business dealings of British PMCs in 
Afghanistan and Iraq12, the customers and tasks British PMCs engage with are 
not likely to be seen to undermine British interests, given the UK’s 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
Yet, even though the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq restructured the PMC 
industry in terms of type of operation, theatre and client, they have not had a 
significant impact on the degree to which PMCs have embarked on 
controversial missions. Out of the four controversial incidents analysed in the 
previous chapter, two – Northbridge’s planned mission in Ivory Coast, and 
Avient’s mission in DR Congo and Zimbabwe – occurred after the invasion of 
Afghanistan. The years 2002-2003 were important because they represented a 
                                                
12
 FCO official Peter January expressed discontent over not being told about big contracts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan by UK PMCs, citing the Aegis contract with the US Department of Defence as an 
example. Interview 7/2/06.  
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change in market structure, but the change in market structure does not appear 
to have had a significant effect on whether or not British PMCs got involved in 
controversies. Therefore, it seems sensible to look for other factors as well, and 
to accept that while the advent of what Peter January calls “respectable money” 
probably makes it less likely that PMCs engage in controversies, it cannot 
stand alone. Thus, this chapter accepts that the market steers PMCs towards 
certain types of customers and contracts prior to the company’s calculation of 
whether or not they should accept a particular contract. But, it also recognises 
that the emergence of new commercial opportunities in a certain segment of 
the market not automatically results in the disappearance of other segments. As 
the incidents involving Northbridge and Avient show, there are still business 
opportunities for PMCs in most parts of the world, and for many types of 
customers. Inevitably, some of these contracts and customers are likely to be 
considered unsavoury by the British Foreign Office. Therefore, the remainder 
of this chapter will examine whether additional explanations can complement 
this one.  
 
5.2.2 Reputation as a moderating factor 
Chapter Two also suggested that a PMC’s concern for its own reputation can 
prevent it from taking profitable, but controversial contracts. Accordingly, the 
PMC declines working for certain types of clients – for instance those with a 
dubious human rights record – and doing certain types of work – presumably, 
work that is close to the “tip of the spear” – out of a fear that this will lead to a 
reputation that deters future clients. This concern for reputation may have 
become more acute with the entry of western states and businesses into the 
PMC client base. According to John Holmes, the director of British PMC 
Erinys, “Iraq has made all companies quite rich. Before, reputable damage 
could be brushed under the carpet. Now, clients like the US and big western 
companies check out the history of the companies before employing them” 
(Holmes 2006 [interview]). With the recent boom in the industry, and the 
resulting proliferation of PMCs, the last few years have seen an increased 
  -65- 
 
competition between different companies. This has made reputation an 
important marketing strategy: “In industries where the barriers to entry are low 
and where, as a result, companies probably cannot compete on price alone, 
firms will necessarily attempt to differentiate themselves in other ways” 
(Herbst quoted in Avant 2005: 221). Furthermore, the concern for reputation is 
frequently cited by members of the PMC industry as the reason for why 
restrictive regulation is unnecessary. According to an ArmorGroup 
spokesperson, their clients “exert the single most powerful influence over the 
company’s activity. ‘Reputation’ has become the key watchword in business 
and the need to protect a reputation is the prime motivator towards legitimate 
and ethical performance and service delivery” (quoted in House of Commons 
2002:point 60).   
 
A concern about company reputation is undoubtedly an important factor 
making the barriers for taking certain types of contracts high. But, it cannot be 
the sole explanation for the low number of PMC controversies. First, not all 
clients care about reputation. As John Holmes was quoted saying above, before 
Afghanistan and Iraq, reputation was not considered an issue of importance. 
Furthermore, one can ask whether it really matters that much even at present. 
In Iraq, Aegis, the company run by Sandline’s managing director, Tim Spicer, 
has been awarded the biggest security contract ever given to a PMC by the 
Pentagon, in spite of the fact that the other companies bidding for the contract 
made the Pentagon aware of Spicer’s controversial past (Almond 2005). In 
addition, one can question whether governmental and corporate clients will 
have the time and resources to vet the record of individual PMCs before hiring 
them (Avant 2005, 222).  
 
In sum, one can agree that what Tim Spicer of Sandline calls “commercial 
common sense” (Spicer quoted in House of Commons 2002), in other words 
not behaving in ways that are likely to deter future clients, contribute to PMC 
convergence. Both the advent of a “respectable” market for private security in 
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Iraq and Afghanistan and an increased focus on company reputation are factors 
that in all likeliness have contributed to keeping the number of controversial 
PMC incidents low. But, even though there is an increased focus on reputation 
among PMC clients now, PMCs largely kept in line with British foreign policy 
interests before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well, in other words before 
the emergence of “reputable money” and the focus on reputation. In other 
words, the PMC’s avoidance of controversial contracts appear somewhat 
disconnected from the client’s focus on reputation. Thus, it will be fruitful to 
consider the extent to which non-rationalist factors can complement rationalist 
factors in explaining the drivers behind PMC behaviour. 
 
5.3.1 Non-rationalist factors – the logic of appropriateness 
Unavoidably, rationalist explanatory models like the ones presented above will 
make certain omissions. Thus, Jonathan Mercer writes that “without denying 
the existence of the mind, scholars in these [rationalist] traditions view the 
mind as exogenous to the study of rationality” (Mercer 2005: 86). Rationalist 
explanations assume that external incentives are the sole, or main, driver for 
behaviour. The following section will attempt to avoid making these omissions 
by attributing causal power to features of the mind. By including internal traits 
in the analysis, such as the effect the professional background of PMC 
decision-makers may have on the choices they make, the aim is to extract a 
more comprehensive insight into the drivers and motivations behind PMC 
activity.  
 
The theoretical foundation for this analysis is the concept of the logic of 
appropriateness, as exemplified in Chapter Two. The logic of appropriateness 
suggests that  
agents do not choose between the most efficient alternatives, but follow rules 
that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual 
opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and 
choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations (March and 
Olsen 1989: 51).  
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The logic of appropriateness departs from rational choice theory in the sense 
that it perceives of behaviour as not being solely concerned with outcomes, but 
also guided by social norms (Elster 1989:113). The empirical foundation for 
applying the logic of appropriateness onto the PMC-context is the fact that the 
majority of PMC executives may have spent 20 or more years in the military 
(Kinsey 2003:199). Here, they have been taught norms of behaviour and values 
typical of the military as a profession. Thus, this section will examine whether 
PMC executives let these values and norms influence their decision-making 
when deciding whether or not to accept a contract. It will take into 
consideration the possibility that some form of loyalty to what is perceived of 
as British interests may implicitly influence PMC behaviour, and as a result, 
British PMCs abstain from contracts that could be regarded as controversial by 
the British government. 
 
5.3.2 The military as the source of norm-guided behaviour 
The military is different from most other professional institutions in that it 
requires a great degree of selfless commitment. In a given situation, the soldier 
is required to lay down his or her life as “part of the job”. This is perhaps the 
extreme example of members of an institution thinking more about whether an 
action conforms to the norms of the organization than about what the 
consequences will be for him- or herself (Peters 1999:28). Furthermore, one 
can argue that “what is different about military codes of honour [compared to 
other types of professional cultures] is that they extend beyond the military 
environment, manifesting themselves in a person’s behaviour long after they 
have left the army” (Kinsey 2003:182). Thus, considering that the PMC setting 
in many ways resembles the military setting – the tasks are similar, and in 
many cases previous military ranks are retained unofficially (ibid: 196) – one 
can imagine that some of the norms learned in the course of 20 years of 
military service will continue to leave a mark on the conduct of officers after 
their transfer to the private sector.  
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According to Christopher Kinsey (2003:182), there are two ways in which 
military culture is taught to the soldier. First, the soldier is institutionalised by 
reproducing patterns of behaviour through “active intervention”, in other words 
through the indoctrination of core values. An example of this is the oath of 
allegiance that British soldiers swear by when joining the British Army, where 
they “agree to subordinate their own interests to those of the unit, Army and 
Nation, as represented by the Crown” (The Military Covenant: point 036):  
I swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her 
Majesty the Queen Elizabeth II, Her Heirs and Successors and that I will as in duty 
bound honestly and faithfully defend Her Majesty, Her Heirs and Successors in 
Person, Crown and Dignity against all enemies and will observe and obey all 
orders of Her Majesty, Her Heirs and Successors and of the Generals and Officers 
set over me (ibid). 
 
Second, Kinsey refers to the “taken-for-granted routine”. In this case, 
“practices are not necessarily questioned or compared against alternatives” 
(2003:82). Certain practices, norms of conduct and values become the soldier’s 
“second nature”, and create a pattern of social behaviour that is not, in general, 
questioned by the soldier him- or herself. The professional ethos of the British 
Army is officially expressed in a document named “Soldiering – The Military 
Covenant”. Concepts like ‘loyalty’ and ‘selfless commitment’ are repeated 
throughout the Covenant, typically expressed in passages like the following: 
“The Nation, the Army and the chain of command rely on the continuing 
allegiance, commitment and support of all who serve: on their loyalty” (The 
Military Covenant: point 0311). Thus, being loyal to crown and country 
appears to be among the most powerful norms taught to British soldiers. First, 
loyalty is consciously and actively instructed to the soldiers through the oath of 
allegiance. Second, the continuous mentioning and emphasis on the 
demonstration of loyalty in documents like the Military Covenant can 
contribute to it eventually become reflexive; a “taken-for-granted routine”. 
Thus, the soldier internalizes certain norms, to the extent that he carries them 
with him into the private domain, where, unlike the military setting, the 
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violation of these norms not necessarily would be met with negative sanctions: 
“When norms are internalized, they are followed even when violation would 
be unobserved and not exposed to sanctions. Shame or anticipation of it is a 
sufficient internal sanction” (Elster 1989:119).  
  
The official company policy of British PMCs is one indication of the degree to 
which norms and values learned in the military is transferred into the private 
sector. Most PMCs have company policies or “codes of conduct” that stipulate 
who they will work for. Many of these reveal a loyalty to the UK government 
that resemble the loyalty to the Crown held in high regard in the military. For 
example, the Blue Sky Group will not operate with organisations unlikely to be 
recognised as legitimate by Her Majesty’s Government (Blue Sky website). 
TASK International will work for overseas governments “providing they are of 
“friendly nation” status with the UK” (TASK website). And, the charter of the 
newly formed British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) to 
which 15 British PMCs hold a founding membership, declares that its members 
must accept fully the obligation to i) “build and promote open and transparent 
relations with UK Government Departments”, and ii) “to promote compliance 
with UK values and interests and with the laws of the countries in which its 
members operate” (BAPSC charter). Furthermore, its members must “decline 
to provide security services that might be contrary to UK values and interests” 
(ibid). 
 
Similarly, statements made by people in the PMC industry bear witness to the 
importance of norms and values learned in the military. For example, the 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee quotes ArmorGroup 
representatives arguing that  
Ex-officers and other professionals of developed world nations normally lead 
these companies and generally maintain strong links to their former 
professions and values, they would ask why should they suddenly lose these 
ethics and discipline just because they have moved into the private sector? 
(2002:point 2.2.1)  
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In a witness examination in the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Sir Patrick Cormack (MP) asked Tim Spicer of Sandline 
whether they had a “blacklist of regimes for which in no circumstances, 
whatever the temptations and whatever the rewards, you would not act?” 
(House of Commons 2002). Mr Spicer confirmed that they do indeed. 
Moreover, he stated that “we go further than that. We keep very closely in 
touch with the legal requirements and we superimpose on that—it may sound 
rather pompous—our own moral view of it as well” (House of Commons 
2002). Indeed, some PMCs have an “ethics committee” composed by 
individuals outside of the company, whose task it is to vet and approve 
assignments before a contract is signed. Among these are Aegis, Spicer’s 
current company, Control Risks, and Olive Group. Michael Grunberg, co-
founder of Sandline, makes a similar argument. Although he is referring to the 
soldier’s behaviour in the field, his claim necessarily rings of accuracy for the 
behaviour of the ex-military PMC managers as well:  
Such individuals [ex-Servicemen working for PMCs] are not going to throw 
their training and discipline away when they join the private sector, and go 
from being model soldiers, with a respect for and great pride in applying the 
highest standards to thugs and wanton slayers of women and children” (quoted 
in Kinsey 2003:194). 
 
Taken together, statements made by members of the British private military 
industry suggest that there is a degree of congruence between the social norms 
instilled in British soldiers and the industry’s practice. Yet, it is hard to provide 
definite evidence of the existence of social norms influencing behaviour. Until 
more evidence is available, this will remain a suggestion, albeit a probable one. 
Still, a closer examination of the incidents of PMC actions being in conflict 
with British interests may provide further grounding for evaluating the 
usefulness of applying the logic of appropriateness to the PMC context. 
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5.3.3 The logic of appropriateness and the controversial incidents 
The ‘controversial incidents’ involving Sandline, Northbridge and Avient 
appear to contradict the claim that PMCs led by ex-officers of the British Army 
are less likely to act against the interests of the British Foreign Office because 
of the social norms of loyalty they have internalized through their military 
careers. In all three companies, former Servicemen from the British military 
held managerial positions, yet the companies acted against British interests. 
Sandline’s director was Tim Spicer, a former Scot’s guard with almost 20 
years of military experience. Northbridge’s director at the time of the 
controversial incidents was Andrew Williams, a former British paratrooper. 
And lastly, Avient was lead by Andrew Smith, a former captain of the Royal 
Engineers. Thus, if a former military career makes controversies less likely, 
one would expect these companies to avoid the types of missions they in fact 
took part in. This section will examine the controversial incidents in light of 
the hypothesis based on the logic of appropriateness, in order to find out 
whether these incidents weaken the hypothesis.  
 
Public statements made by the managers of two of these companies, Sandline 
and Northbridge, go some way in clarifying this misfit by implying that the 
managers believed they were doing something ‘good and right’. In fact, both of 
the managers seem puzzled by the negative reactions to the jobs they did, 
implying that the British government’s misgivings came as a surprise to them. 
For instance, Tim Spicer of Sandline saw the Sierra Leonean president Kabbah 
as an ally of the UK, and consequently believed aiding him would be 
appreciated by the British government:  
President Kabbah was Prime Minister Tony Blair’s personal guest at the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Edinburgh, a pretty public 
statement of British support. All this, I suggest, tends to indicate that helping 
Kabbah was regarded as a good thing and could be expected to gain widespread 
support in the higher echelons of the British government (Spicer 2000:194). 
Similarly, Northbridge representatives seem taken aback by the government’s 
reactions to their planned operations in the Ivory Coast. According to a 
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Northbridge press release, Jack Straw’s condemnation of Northbridge’s 
planned involvement in the Ivorian conflict “come as a great surprise when it 
was he that strongly supported the use of private military companies in a 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office document” (quoted in BBC News 2003).  
Furthermore, the fact that neither Northbridge nor Sandline tried to conceal 
their operations prior to them taking place underscores the impression that they 
were unaware that what they were involved in could be seen as controversial. 
Sandline informed the British High Commissioners of both Papua New Guinea 
and Sierra Leone of their upcoming contracts (Spicer 2000). Northbridge 
normally announces new contracts in press releases, as they did in the incident 
involving the Ivory Coast13. 
 
The Sandline and Northbridge managers seem to be concerned about doing the 
right thing, which involves not going against British interests. But, their 
conception of British interests is more straightforward – one could say naïve – 
than that of the government. The Sandline and Northbridge managers appear to 
be unaware that for most western states, taking part in a humanitarian 
intervention in the third world is not merely a question of having the sufficient 
manpower and capabilities. The complex relationship between state 
sovereignty and international law on the one hand, and the perceived duty to 
intervene for humanitarian purposes on the other has passed these companies 
by. A sense of righteous indignation resulting from the perception that 
Sandline, unlike apparently apathetic western governments, “does the right 
thing” by helping out governments plagued by internal unrest, but still gets 
drawn into controversy is evident throughout the Sandline manager, Tim 
Spicer’s, autobiography. For example, Spicer writes of Australia’s reluctance 
to interfere in Papua New Guinea: “Why was it that they were not helping 
these people win the war? (…) This reinforced the views Tony and I already 
held, that there were legitimate governments that needed help and when 
friendly nations refused to supply it they would eventually turn to the private 
                                                
 
13
 A link to the most recent press releases can be found on the Northbeidge website. 
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sector” (2000:155). Furthermore, he makes the argument that “[i]f the UN, and 
the international community as a whole, continues to ignore its oft-vaunted 
responsibilities for solving or stemming civil wars and racial bloodbaths, it is 
hard to se where the involvement of PMCs like Sandline or Executive 
Outcomes can do anything other than good” (ibid:53). Similarly, Northbridge 
typically begins its press releases with the citation “The only thing necessary 
for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing” (Press Release 22 July 
2003, website). In addition, neither Spicer nor the Northbridge director, 
Wilson, appear to understand that few governments would feel relieved if a 
private company, unsanctioned by its home state, helped a third world 
government quell an insurgency, even when there is a legitimate reason to 
intervene. By aiding another state militarily and at the same time bypassing its 
home state, like Sandline did in Papua New Guinea, the PMC in effect makes 
policy, and thereby intrudes into the state’s domain. Unsurprisingly, few 
governments enjoy seeing their decision-making capacity diminished or taken 
over by private actors.  
 
Finally, one cannot disregard the possibility that this seemingly naïve 
understanding of international politics is a face-saving strategy for managers 
caught red-handed doing something they deep down knew was controversial. 
Still, by making excuses, the Sandline and Northbridge managers place their 
companies within the group of ‘legitimate actors’ most PMCs claim to belong 
to. They may try to get away with dubious business dealings by hoping that 
they remain undiscovered, but they do take notice of what is considered right 
and wrong by the British government, and attempt to appear to be doing what 
is right. Thereby, they implicitly accept that certain values are overarching and 
should be followed, despite the fact that there is no legal obligation in place 
requiring British PMCs to follow them. Thus, one can conclude that Sandline 
and Northbridge, while having acted in conflict with British interests, consider 
these interests as important and appear to be concerned not to be perceived 
otherwise. Therefore, the influence of the social norms instilled through 
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military education seems to have an effect even in the cases of Sandline and 
Northbridge. 
 
5.5 Avient: a different type of company? 
One of the companies seems to escape all of the regulative influences 
suggested in this chapter, both the concern for reputation, the structural effects 
of market change, and the influence of social norms. Avient appears to be a 
different sort of company than most other PMCs included in this study. Little is 
known of the company other than the name of its manager and his background, 
and the before-mentioned episode involving DR Congo and Zimbabwe. This 
makes Avient different, and may imply that it bears a closer resemblance to the 
mercenary or ad hoc company, as they are sometimes called, than to the 
‘legitimate’ PMC as exemplified by ArmorGroup or Control Risks.  
 
Kinsey (2003:107) writes of the ad hoc company that 
They tend to accept contracts involving questionable actions that 
border on the illegal, and therefore do not wish to draw attention to 
themselves. As a consequence of this, individuals working for this 
group are secretive of what they do so not to land themselves or their 
employer in trouble. A further effect of their questionable behaviour is 
the short lifespan these companies appear to have, sometimes lasting 
no longer than a single contract. The companies are easily set up, 
dismantled, or sold on to another company.  
Avient’s undertakings were more markedly in opposition to British foreign 
policy than what was the case in the incidents involving Sandline and 
Northbridge. The strained relationship between Zimbabwe and the UK was 
well-known to most people; Zimbabwe was suspended from the 
Commonwealth in March 2002 and in the same year, the EU imposed an arms 
embargo on the country and an asset freeze and travel ban on President 
Mugabe. The second country Avient was involved in, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), was also subject to an EU arms embargo. Unlike the UN 
embargo against Sierra Leone at the time of the Sandline affair, the arms 
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embargo against the DRC was unambiguous and included all political 
groupings in the country. Avient bypassed the embargo by registering as a 
company in Zimbabwe instead of in the UK (Barnett and Harris, 2002). Unlike 
Sandline and Northbridge, Avient representatives have not made any official 
statements expressing regret, nor have they attempted to clear the company’s 
name by pleading ignorance, as Spicer did. Instead, Avient’s manager, Andrew 
Smith, has been quoted in newspaper interviews saying that he did nothing 
wrong as his company was registered in Zimbabwe, thus admitting that he 
intentionally bypasses official weapons embargos (ibid).  
 
The Avient-incident demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between 
the PMC and the ad hoc company, but also the difficulty in trying to do so as 
long as there is no official registry of PMCs. The key difference between these 
types of companies can be found in the perspectives they hold regarding their 
own future. A PMC is normally established with a view towards economic 
growth and expansion, and hence takes a long-term perspective of its future as 
a business. An ad-hoc company, on the other hand, may only exist for the 
course of one single contract, and subsequently change name or dissolve. 
Avient appears to reside within the latter category of companies. It is not too 
worried about its own reputation, nor does it seem to be particularly concerned 
about upholding some kind of ‘code of honour’. Both of these are, as we have 
seen above, factors that may restrain other PMCs from doing jobs that the 
British government would oppose.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed three possible lines of explanation for why British 
PMCs more often than not stay away from contracts that are likely to cause 
controversies in the British Foreign Office. First, an explanation based on a 
rather crude and simplistic version of rational choice theory was examined. It 
was found to be insufficient in accounting for why several British PMCs 
appear to avoid working for certain clients, typically states with a poor human 
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rights record or states that are on unfriendly terms with the UK. Second, an 
amended and more sophisticated rationalist explanation was brought in. It 
included two different elements that may play out separately, but seem to be 
linked in this context. The first element focuses on the effect the emergence of 
a market for private security in Afghanistan and Iraq has had on PMCs. The 
second element focuses on how the PMC boom in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
brought with it an increased focus on company reputation, with the possible 
result that PMCs take the long-term implications for future business 
opportunities into account when considering a contract.  
 
While the advent of a reputable market and a related focus on reputation can go 
some way in explaining PMC-foreign policy convergence, these factors cannot 
stand alone. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did not bring with them a 
significant overall decline in controversial PMC incidents, and it is unlikely 
that every PMC would be concerned with its own reputation, as there always 
will be clients that are not bothered about, or will not take the time to vet, PMC 
records. In addition, the companies that were involved in the controversial 
incidents made no attempt at concealment. One of the companies, Northbridge, 
even sent out a press release declaring its upcoming contract, an act that 
resulted in the foreign secretary’s condemnation. Hence, it can be valuable to 
consider non-rationalist factors as well.  
 
The third line of explanation considered in this chapter concerned the effect 
social norms may have on the choices of PMC managers. Although few British 
PMCs demonstrate an explicit inclination towards cooperating with the British 
Foreign Office, there are indications that many British PMCs hold British 
interests and values, as well as the UK’s standing in the world in high regard, 
and would therefore prefer not work against the UK. Most PMC executives 
have previously served in the British Army, where loyalty to crown and 
country were fundamental principles defining what was and was not 
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appropriate actions. Furthermore, PMC statements and company policies often 
disclose the continuing importance of British interests to PMCs.  
 
However, it is worth noting that even though many PMC executives appear to 
be keen not to cut across British foreign policy interests in their activities, their 
conception of British interests and the Government’s conception may not 
always converge. The British Foreign Office has no set guidelines as to what it 
considers respectable PMC behaviour (January 2006 [interview]). If PMCs are 
in fact striving to be seen as reputable by their home government, all they can 
lean on are official embargo lists and a general gut feeling over what is 
considered good conduct. Thus, the regulatory effect of a “loyalty to the 
Crown”-perception among PMC managers depend on the extent to which the 
managers’ understanding of British interests converge with that of the 
government. The incidents involving Sandline and Northbridge can be seen as 
examples of PMC managers having a different conception of what is “right and 
wrong” in international politics than the British government. Lastly, the 
incident involving Avient demonstrates how companies sometimes appear to 
be immune to both the regulative effects of the emergence of new markets, the 
concern for one’s reputation, and the transfer of professional military values 
into the private sector. This may indicate that a reliance on values for 
converging behaviour is unwise as it is unlikely that every former Serviceman 
will continue to adhere to such values, and that a reliance on reputation 
depends on the PMC having a long-term perspective of its future as a business. 
 
This chapter has not included all the possible reasons for why British PMCs 
tend to avoid jobs that conflict with British interests. The chapter has 
concentrated on assessing motivations for behaviour that are consistent with 
contrasting theoretical tenets, aiming to exemplify different ways of looking at 
the PMC phenomenon. But, a number of other possibilities exist. For example, 
British PMCs may avoid conflict in order to prevent the government from 
implementing restrictive regulations on their activities, or because they 
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consider the UK a potential future customer. Furthermore, the possibility that 
different motivations work together and reinforce each other is not negligible. 
For instance, the concern about doing what is appropriate can be reinforced by 
a commercial concern about the effects of reputation on business. Deborah 
Avant argues that the best way for a state to make PMC activities converge 
with its foreign policy objectives is to become a client:  “Ex-soldiers will be 
most likely to be loyal to the crown if the state uses commercial logics and 
tools to encourage such loyalty. Part of what makes the US government’s 
influence of its PMCs so firm is its use of commercial incentives” (Avant 2006 
[personal correspondence]). Walker and Whyte make a similar point:  
The influence of military professional cultures (with PMCs employing 
many ex-service personnel) and the more pragmatic knowledge that 
governments are major potential paymasters, make it very unlikely that, 
for example, a British PMC would embark upon a mission contrary to the 
United Kingdom foreign or defence policy (2005: 663). 
The most important conclusion this thesis can draw regarding PMC 
motivations is that PMC decision-making is not made on the basis of a single, 
clean-cut profit-maximising strategy. As in most instances of human decision-
making, PMCs make choices on the basis of a number of different influences, 
ranging from a concern about making money while retaining a good reputation 
and avoiding restrictive regulation to also being able to hold one’s head high, 
not having to feel ashamed about the job one does. 





Today’s PMC phenomenon brings to light some important questions 
concerning the relationship between the state and private wielders of legitimate 
force. If the most intrinsic feature of the state during the 19th and 20th centuries 
was its monopolization of legitimate force, what will happen to the system of 
states if this monopoly dissolves? Does the rise of the PMC represent the 
beginning of the end of the state? One way of illuminating these issues is to 
examine the extent to which the PMC’s home state has any influence on its 
behaviour. This thesis has attempted to find out whether British PMCs for the 
most part act in conflict or convergence with British foreign policy interests. 
Contrary to widespread expectations, the thesis has found that British PMCs 
rarely enter into agreements that conflict with British interests. This finding is 
important because it indicates that PMCs are unlikely to challenge the role of 
the state in international security. PMC are not likely to wage wars, enter into 
security alliances, and get caught in security dilemmas or arms races outside of 
the premises set by states. To paraphrase Waltz (1979: 94), the state sets the 
scene in which the PMC operates. This chapter will first give a brief summary 
of the analyses and findings of the thesis. Subsequently, it will assess what the 
implications of the findings are for the wider issues this thesis sought to 
address, namely the question of the relative autonomy of the PMC as a unit in 
the international system 
 
6.1 Historical parallels 
The historical parallels to current-day PMCs make for an interesting study. 
Mercenaries were common features of international relations up until the 18th 
century. They came in different shapes and sizes – from the free lancers and 
bands of soldiers for hire, to the armed branches of trading companies, as 
privateers and as individuals selling their military skills. They were legitimate 
in that their existence was accepted by states; authoritative in that they 
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commanded the use of force; and international in that they operated across 
borders and in several states at the same time. Interestingly, private wielders of 
force came to be seen as illegitimate in the western world as the Westphalian 
system of states consolidated in the course of the 19th century, and as states 
developed their own standing armies. The Weberian state, with its monopoly 
over the legitimate use of force, had no room for mercenaries. In other words, 
there are no historical examples of private wielders of force peacefully co-
existing with a strong state.  
 
Today’s PMC phenomenon stems from the immediate post-Cold War years. 
Three factors stand out as the most important reasons for the rise of the PMC: 
First, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent global de-militarization 
created a surplus of military manpower and equipment. Many officers were left 
unemployed, and went on to form or work for PMCs. Second, the Cold War 
also meant the end of superpower patronage for third world states, which again 
led to a rise in civil unrest in many parts of the third world. PMCs were 
employed by both third world governments and by commercial companies 
operating in these parts of the world. Third, the 1980s and 1990s saw the birth 
of the neoliberal project, involving a widespread move towards the 
deregulation of trade and capital movement and the privatisation of state 
services throughout the western world. This ensured both an increased 
acceptance of the PMC industry as a concept, a home market for the first 
PMCs selling military support- and training services, and eased their ability to 
operate globally. By operating internationally and existing as permanent and 
legitimate corporate entities, today’s PMCs have more in common with the 18th 
century trading companies than with the villain mercenaries that were active in 
Africa during the decolonisation period. It is this commonality that makes 
PMCs interesting from a theoretical perspective, and particularly so if one 
takes into consideration the weakness of the state system in the trading 
companies’ heydays. 
 
  -81- 
 
6.2 Current-day PMCs: autonomous actors? 
The PMC challenges the state because it shares one of the state’s most 
important capabilities – the capacity for using organised violence – while being 
a commercial company, whose foremost concern is to acquire profits. It is the 
capacity of the PMC to act autonomously – in other words, to act as if the state 
has no legislative, normative or other type of influence over the PMC – that 
makes the PMC a possible challenger to the state as an independent actor in the 
international system. This thesis measures the autonomy of British PMCs from 
the state by asking whether their activities generally conflict or converge with 
British foreign policy interests, focussing on the period between 1997 and 
2005. Out of the 39 companies included in this study, only three have been 
involved in activities that can be deemed to conflict with British foreign policy 
interests. Sandline International aided the ousted government of Sierra Leone 
in the midst of conflict, breaking an international arms embargo on the country. 
The same company aided the government of Papua New Guinea during an 
internal rebellion, causing Australian anger, and possibly contributing to the 
subsequent fall of the Papuan government in a military coup d’etat. 
Northbridge was contracted to strike down on an internal rebel force in the 
Ivory Coast, which would have disturbed a fragile peace brokered by France. 
Avient was contracted by the governments of DR Congo and Zimbabwe, and 
has thus both aided an unfriendly government and broken the international 
arms embargoes imposed on Zimbabwe and DR Congo at the time.  
 
It is, of course, not impossible that there are conflicting incidents that this 
thesis has overlooked, as the companies in question are best served by keeping 
their activities secret. Nevertheless, compared to the total number of contracts 
all 39 British PMCs have entered into since 1997, even the doubling of 
controversial incidents from four to eight would not have had a significant 
impact on the overall conclusion – that the activities of British PMCs generally 
converge with British foreign policy interests. Indeed, most of the jobs British 
PMCs take support British foreign policy interests. A typical job for a PMC 
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can be the protection of westerners working in conflict zones, such as NGO 
employees, businesspeople or government officials. Other PMC tasks include 
humanitarian work, such as demining, the training of foreign armed forces and 
the protection of oil pipes or mines. These tasks are not uncontroversial. The 
private provision of armed force is ethically troubling, and questions 
concerning legitimacy, transparency and accountability are left unanswered. 
But, PMC tasks like these are accepted, an even supported by the UK; they are 
carried out within the framework of the state and do not intrude into the state’s 
domain as an actor in international security. 
 
6.3 Explaining the convergence 
Chapter Five discussed different explanations for why British PMCs avoid 
controversial jobs. British PMCs remain unregulated by British law, and can in 
principle work for anyone and sell any service. Thus, the influences restricting 
PMC behaviour must be of a more informal origin. Three different sources 
were considered, of which the first two can be placed within a rationalist 
explanatory framework while the last one draws on norm-based explanations. 
First, changes in the market for private force probably works to reduce the 
attractiveness of the types of jobs that can be said to cut across British 
interests. A rational, profit-seeking PMC would probably prefer working for 
wealthy western governments or commercial companies in Iraq or Afghanistan 
to impoverished rebel groups or weak governments in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Second, as competition has soared in the private security industry, reputation 
has arguably become a more important concern for the companies bidding for 
contracts (Avant 2005: 221), making the long-term costs of taking certain 
contracts high. Again, one can presume that a rational, profit-seeking PMC in 
some cases would consider the future costs of having a dubious reputation due 
to a controversial past to outweigh the immediate benefits of a controversial 
contract. The third explanation draws on the “logic of appropriateness”, and 
takes into account the effects the social norms held by the individuals running 
British PMCs can have on the company’s behaviour. Practically all British 
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PMCs are run by ex-servicemen of the British army, most of them highly 
decorated individuals. These people have spent most of their professional 
careers defending the UK and British interests, sometimes risking their lives 
for their country. This presupposes a considerable degree of loyalty to their 
home state, a value that is directly and indirectly indoctrinated into army 
recruits throughout their military training. Elster writes that behaviour is not 
only guided by outcomes, but also by social norms (Elster 1989: 113). 
Consequently, one can argue that the ex-British Army managers of PMCs are 
likely to avoid contracts that conflict with the interests of the UK, as this would 
cut across a deeply held social norm.  
 
These three explanations all have their weaknesses, and do not represent an 
exhaustive picture of all the possible explanations there are for why a PMC 
acts as it does. Yet, when taken together, these proposals may give some 
indication of how likely it is that an independent, state-detached PMC industry 
will emerge some time in the future. Presumably, the use of PMCs by western 
companies and governments, themselves being held to account over their own 
and their agents’ actions, would lead to a heightened concern among PMCs for 
their own reputation, and make controversial clients in war-torn third world 
countries less attractive. On the other hand, if the current upper-scale market in 
Iraq and Afghanistan disappears, companies could end up competing to sell 
their services to rebel governments in Africa and their equivalents. Similarly, if 
non-military individuals with a less acute sense of loyalty to the British state 
enter into the PMCs’ managerial teams, there is a risk that profit making will 
override any concern for not cutting across the UK’s interests. In sum, the 
current picture of PMC activities shows that the state is more influential in the 
dealings of private actors that what one could expect. This limits the degree to 
which one can draw parallels with previous era of trading companies and 
privateers. In the western world, the state system appears to be consolidated to 
the extent that it takes more than a couple of decades of strengthening of non-
state actors to uproot it. 
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Chapter Two asked whether the rise of PMCs proved the realists’ insistence 
that states are the only meaningful actors in international security wrong. It 
suggested that if the capacity to use force is what defines an actor in the 
international system, as proposed by the realist philosopher Raymond Aron, 
then PMCs cannot easily be disregarded. This thesis shows that even though a 
non-state actor can take on some of the most important traits of the state – such 
as the provision of security – this does not necessarily entail that the non-state 
actor is able to challenge the state’s position. If one accepts Kenneth Waltz’ 
claim that ”a theory that denies the central role of states will be needed only if 
non-state actors develop to the point of rivalling or surpassing the great 
powers, not just a few of the minor ones” (Waltz 1979: 95), then the rise of the 
PMC industry requires no new theory of IR. The influence of the state on non-
state actors is significant, and to claim that states have been reduced to 
“impossible units” and “intermediate institutions sandwiched between 
increasingly powerful local, regional and global mechanisms of governance” 
(Held 1999: 3) does not ring of accuracy when discussing security policy. Still, 
the growth in influence of non-state actors, including PMCs, multinational 
companies, NGOs and international terrorist groups, indicate that states are not 
the only central actors on the international stage. If we are witnessing the rise 
of non-state actors as players in international affairs, this does not so much 
challenge the existence of the state system per se, at least not of yet. But, it 
may challenge the way the state governs. In a security-political context, this 
may imply that “the centralized provision of security seems to have been the 
exception, rather than the rule, in geographical as well as historical terms” 
(Krahmann 2003:11). Currently, PMCs operate in a world consisting of 
sovereign states, and in most instances they work for sovereign states. For 
strong, western states, PMCs are new, flexible tools of security governance and 
not independent actors willing to and capable of waging war single-handedly.   
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Appendix: Table of British Private Military Companies 











Aegis “Research and development, 
technical services, security 
operations” 
Contracted by 
the US DoD to 
provide security 
support services 


















Risk and Crisis Management; Fraud 
Investigation; Surveillance; 
Technical Counter-surveillance; 
Security Management; Counter 
Terrorist and Hostage Release; 
Maritime Security; Aviation Security 
and Air Cargo Security at all levels; 
Close Protection and Executive 








AKE Group Risk assessment, security planning, 
intelligence gathering, political 
analysis and on-the-ground 








ArmorGroup Security Planning and 
Management, Training, Mine 
Action, Response Centre, Kidnap 
and Ransom, Humanitarian 
Support, Information Business 
Intelligence and Fraud, Intellectual 
Property Asset Protection. Mainly: 






Blue Sky Peacekeeping, security training, 




                                                
14
 Note that most of the companies have skills and personnel that enable them to move easily between 
different types of tasks, depending on what is called for by the customer. As one of the companies, 
Henderson, writes on its website: “we are solutions driven rather than product led” 
(www.hrlgroup.com). Therefore, the core competencies currently referred to on their websites reflect 
today’s market as much as their actual specialty. This is the reason for why some companies that do 
not immediately appear to be PMCs by the services they offer are included on the list. 
15
 This column is meant to give a taste of what the company does, and is by no means an extensive list. 
To the extent possible, I have tried to give an example of the company’s biggest contract. Where the 
slots are empty, it has not been possible to find a concrete example of a contract the PMC has taken.  





Security training, close protection Provides security 
for private 





Close Protection of key personnel, 
Security drivers, Information 




in South America 
Indeterminate 
Centurion Risk assessment, security training Hostile 
environments 





Risk assessment, security training, 
guarding and protection, screening, 
intelligence, crisis management, 
DDR-programmes etc.  
Provides armed 
protection of the 
British Embassy 
and British 
officials in Iraq. 
Operative 
Chilport Ltd Security/risk/threat assessments, 
customs and border controls, port 
area security,  
Protection 








Protection, military training, 
demining 
Protects oil 



















Peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, 
and infrastructure support 
Provided police 
officers for the 
international 
police force in 
Bosnia 
Operative 
Erinys Specialist protection services, 
managed guard forces, security 
survey planning and management, 
risk analysis. 
Contracted by 
the Iraqi Ministry 
of Oil to protect 
oil and gas 
pipelines 
Operative 
Genric Security and risk assessment, 
security management, personal, 
asset and property protection, 
electronic surveillance detection, 
security support operations, 











Crisis management, kidnap and 
extortion management, fraud and 




in Iraq and trains 






Personal and asset protection, 
aviation security, security training, 
“end-to-end” risk management 
service.  
Provided security 





Security management, protection, 
analysis, surveillance, crisis 
management 
Oil and gas 










Armed protection, waterborne 
security services, sub-surface 
detection and deterrence, anti-














Security consultancy, assessment 
and planning, physical guarding 
and security management, shore-
side security guards, bodyguards 
Military training 
and support for 
the government 




Rapid response teams, kidnap 
response, security manpower in 
high risk areas, risk control 
planning, security risk analysis, 
political risk analysis 








and support staff 
such as 
interpreters for a 
major European 
oil company in 
Iraq” 
Operative 
ICP Group Ltd Close protection/bodyguards (static 
and mobile), secure 
accommodation, armored vehicles, 
personal protection equipment, field 
operations supplies, due diligence, 
risk assessment, audits and project 
evaluation/analysis, medical 
services, hostile environment 
training, specialist insurance 
coverage (through Lloyds of 
London), crisis management, and 
business continuity services and 
evacuation support and services 
Helped with the 
rescue operation 










Provides full military deployment 
and procurement, military advice 
and special forces training, 
surveillance and close protection, 









Special projects (armed extraction 
of personnel, counter intelligence); 
close protection; defensive driving 
courses; risk assessment 
Obtained 




led to the 





Corporate Investigation and Due 
Diligence, Digital Forensics, 
Remote Sensing, Technical 
Operations, Security Integration, 
Kidnap and Ransom, Information 
Assurance, Threat Analysis and 
Intelligence Gathering 
Provided 
protection for the 
Dalai Lama on 
his UK tour 
Operative 








“We are a supplier of risk 
management services including a 
range of security resources for the 





travelling to Iraq 
Operative 
Northbridge “Specialises in providing highly 
confidential and effective security 
related services designed to 
address the needs of Governments, 
Multi-National Corporations, Non 
Governmental Organisations, the 
Corporate Sector and Prominent 
Individuals." 
Rescued British 







Olive Group Analysis & Assessment (A2); 
Consulting; Logistics & Project 
Support; SecureLocate™; Security 









Pilgrims Group Special projects (risk analysis, 
security assessment, crisis 
management, protection of 
personnel and assets); 
communication services; 
intelligence; security training; rapid 
response teams 





Rubicon  Research and intelligence, due 
diligence, technical services, crisis 
management, negotiation/force 
protection/surveillance, close 
protection, security training.  
Provided security 





Aegis in 2005 
Sabre Security equipment, close 
protection/bodyguards (static and 
mobile), secure accommodation, 
armoured vehicles, personal 
protection equipment, project and 
site risk assessment, audits and 











Training in all security disciplines, 
including military and para-military 
activities, Corporate defence in all 
its aspects, Security Consultancy, 
VIP protection, Security surveys 
and audits, mobile and static 
guarding, security couriers, 
Contingency planning and crisis 
management, Kidnap, ransom and 
extortion, Investigations, 
Surveillance and counter 
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Security advise, security training, 
operational support, intelligence 
support, humanitarian operations, 
strategic communications, support 
for law and order. 
Contracted by 
the government 
of Papua New 
Guinea to help 
quell an 
insurgency 




Military Resettlement Training; 
Close Protection Training and 
Provision; Military, Naval, Police 
and Prisons in-service Training; 
Investigations; Asset Tracing and 
Private Security Training; 
Management Training, Diplomatic 
Security Training and Provision, 
Event Management, Close 
Protection, Risk Assessments, 
Surveillance, Asset Recovery, 
Investigations including Investment 






















Strategic support, the selection and 
training of Special Forces troops, 
counterinsurgency training, basic 
and advanced infantry training, 
weapons recommendation and 
procurement, intelligence services. 
humanitarian support, and advice 
on objectives, logistics, air 





Maritime security Provided security 








Offers physical security, close 
protection, canine services, 
electronic counter measures, 
maritime security and explosive 
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British PMCs’ Websites 
 
Company name                          Web address 
 AD Consultancy www.adconsultancy.com 
Aegis www.aegisworld.com 
Avient www.avient.aero 
AMA Associated Ltd www.ama-assoc.co.uk 
AKE Group www.akegroup.com 
ArmorGroup www.armorgroup.com 
Blue Sky www.blueskysc.org 
BritAm Defence Ltd www.britamdefence.com 
Carnelian International Risks www.carnelian-international.com 
Centurion www.centurion-riskservices.co.uk   
Control Risks Group www.crg.com 
Chilport Ltd www.chilport.co.uk 
Defence Systems Limited (Has merged with ArmorGroup) 
Decisions Strategies Vance www.decision-strategies.com  
Dyncorp Aerospace Ltd www.dyncorpuk.com 
Erinys www.erinysinternational.com 
Genric www.genric.co.uk 
Global Risk International www.globalrisk.uk.com 
Global Risk Strategies www.globalrsl.com 
Global Development Four/Crown Agents www.crownagents.com/AnnualReview/def
ault.asp?step=4&pid=740 
Global Marine Security Systems/HART www.hartsecurity.com 
Gurkha Security Guards, Ltd  
Henderson Risk www.hrlgroup.org 
ICP Group Ltd www.icpgroup.ltd.uk 
ISEC Corporate Security/Westminster Int’l www.wg-
plc.com/international/security/privatemilita
ry.html 
International Intelligence Limited www.int-int.co.uk 
The Inkerman Group www.inkerman.com 
Janusian Security and Risk Management www.janusian.com 
Northbridge www.northbridgeservices.com 
Olive Group www.olivesecurity.com 
Pilgrims Group www.pilgrimsgroup.co.uk 
Rubicon  www.rubicon-international.com 
Sabre www.securitybysabre.com 
Saladin Security  www.saladin-security.com/    
Sandline www.sandline.com 
TASK International www.task-int.com 
THULE Global Security www.brainstemdowry.com/work/thule 
Trident Maritime www.trident3.com 
UK Defence Services www.ukdefence.co.uk 
 
